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ABSTRACT 
 
PENSION REFORM AND RETIREMENT INCENTIVES: 
EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRIA 
 
By 
 
ROMAN RAAB 
 
August 2008 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
 
The scope of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of pension reform on the 
financial incentives to retire for private sector workers in Austria. How do financial 
incentives embedded in the Austrian pension system affect individual retirement behavior? 
Was pension reform effective in changing these financial incentives in order to affect 
retirement behavior? How would future reform scenarios impact retirement behavior? 
Micro-estimating the impact of financial incentive measures on the probability of retirement 
shows that the behavioral response to financial incentives in Austria is relatively large in 
international comparison. Simulations demonstrate that pension reform was ineffective in 
providing incentives for delayed retirement. However, there are future reform scenarios that 
would have a huge impact on retirement behavior by altering the financial incentives. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation 
 
This dissertation deals with the financial incentives to retire in Austria. Older 
workers retire relatively early compared to similar OECD countries. Therefore, labor force 
participation of older workers is one of the lowest among OECD countries. The public 
pension system and its retirement policies as well as old age unemployment account for the 
trend to retire at the earliest possible point in time. In particular, financial incentives to retire 
before the statutory retirement ages are embedded in the Austrian PAYGO-pension system. 
These incentives are relatively high in international comparison. Moreover, politicians often 
tried to solve the issues of older workers on the Austrian labor market by early retirement. 
Even disability pensions were used to take out older workers form the labor market. 
Therefore, a key issue of pension reform is to bring actual retirement ages closer to the 
statutory retirement ages. Around the millennium, government implemented some gradual 
pension reforms to change retirement behavior. Also, micro-data of Austrian workers 
became available. 
The scope of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of pension reform on the 
financial incentives to retire for private sector workers. How do financial incentives 
embedded in the Austrian pension system affect individual retirement behavior? Was 
 1 
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pension reform effective in changing these financial incentives? How would future reform 
scenarios impact retirement behavior? 
Hofer and Koman (2006) showed for some stylized cases, that the incentives to 
retire early are relatively high in Austria compared to other countries. Using the methodology 
portrayed in Gruber and Wise (2004), this study will expand the analysis in Hofer and 
Koman (2006) by micro-estimating the response of Austrians to changes in financial 
incentives. Moreover, this dissertation is looking at the gender differences in behavior, and at 
the impact of pension reform 2000. Finally, this study will use theses estimates to simulate 
the impact of past and future reform scenarios on retirement behavior. 
Austria is often left out in international comparative studies. However, it is a very 
interesting country in many areas. Austria has a long tradition of early retirement and hence a 
very low labor force participation of older workers. Moreover, the granting of disability 
pensions is very generous in Austria. So a huge share of Austrian retirees retires on disability 
pensions unlike in most other countries. Furthermore, the public pension system is the only 
source of old age income for Austrians. There are almost no private pension plans or firm 
pension plans. Finally, Austria is one of the very few countries that have different legal 
retirement ages for men and women. Gruber and Wise (2004) show that the features of 
pension plans vary largely form country to country. Therefore, this study analyzes the 
Austrian case using a detailed administrative micro-data set. 
This dissertation shows that the behavioral response to financial incentives 
embedded in the Austrian pension system is relatively large in international comparison. 
Also, there are some striking behavioral differences between men and women. Therefore, 
past and future reforms altering the financial incentives had and will have a huge impact on 
retirement behavior. 
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In order to address these questions, this study will first show how pension benefits 
are calculated in Austria. Then, it is shown how reform 2000 altered this calculation. Next, 
there is need to construct the financial incentive measures. This study uses these to regress 
them on the choice to retire along with a set of controls. The estimates are the base for 
simulating the effect of reform 2000 and two future reform scenarios. The simulations show 
how the probability of retirement at certain ages changes as pension benefits and the 
incentives alter by reform.  
Therefore, the organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 will give a 
brief overview of the institutional setup of the Austrian pension system and of past reform 
steps. Chapter 3 reviews the previous related literature on labor supply of older workers and 
retirement incentives. Chapter 4 introduces a theory of labor supply in a life-cycle setting 
endogenizing the date of retirement. Chapter 5 discusses the micro-data used in the 
regressions, and the empirical strategy. Main explanatory variables are the financial incentives 
to retire, i.e., social security wealth, the social security wealth accrual, the peak value, the 
option value, and the implicit social security tax on work. Chapter 6 presents the regression 
results. Chapter 7 uses the estimates to simulate the effects of past and future reforms on 
retirement behavior. Chapter 8 will conclude this study summarizing the main results as well 
as presenting a set of policy recommendations for future reforms. 
 
Background 
 
The major reason to discuss the Austrian public pension system is the very low labor 
force participation rate of older workers. An increasingly aging population puts enormous 
current and future pressure on the financing of the pension system. Therefore, it is 
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appropriate to give a brief overview of the key features describing the Austrian retirement 
economics. In an international comparison, the extent of the low labor force participation 
rate among older workers in Austria becomes apparent, while other retirement parameters 
are within international standards. The Austrian public pension system guarantees a relatively 
high standard of living for seniors. However, it suffers from some serious issues that 
compromise the long-term sustainability of its finances as well as intergenerational fairness. 
Especially the increasingly aging population has become a major threat for future 
generations’ old age income security. Paralleling the general trend in most developed 
countries, the elderly dependency ratio1 will increase from 22.9 percent in 2002 to 54.9 
percent in 2050 (refer to table 1).  
In 1996, contributions paid by workers into the pension system covered 75 percent 
of total pension expenditures. The remainder was paid out of the federal budget. Also, the 
share of old age benefits relative to GDP which is 11.25 percent is not showing any 
abnormality in a cross-country comparison. Therefore, these numbers are not a priori 
alarming considering that they roughly reflect the current shares of elderly population in 
those societies. 
The high replacement rate2 in Austria is often criticized as too generous as for 
instance Koch and Thimann (1999) point out. However, it is understandable that in 
complete absence of a private pension pillar, this is a way to avoid widespread old age 
poverty. Therefore, net pension benefits that cover 90 percent of pre-retirement earnings are 
appropriate given the complete absence of private pension plans. However, it seems that the 
benefit structure is a priori the reason for crowding out private pension insurance. 
                                                 
1 The elderly dependency ratio is defined as the population aged 65 or older/population aged 15 to 64. 
More generally, the elderly dependency ratio is retirees/population in labor force. 
 
2 The replacement rate is defined as pension benefits/pre retirement earnings. 
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Additionally, the payroll tax contributions of 22.8 percent of gross income are also 
relatively high in international comparison. Lower replacement rates could only be justified 
in case of lower payroll taxes or in case of a discontinuing the employer-financed part of the 
payroll tax. Thus, the basic cost-benefit structure of the Austrian pension system is not the 
primary issue that needs to be resolved. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Retirement in Austria and selected countries 
Labor force participation rate 
(b) 
Age Group 
Statutory retirement 
age  
Average 
retirement age 
(d) 
Country 
Old age benefits 
as % of GDP 
 
55-
59 
60-
64 
65-
69 
70-
74 75+ Males Females Males Females 
Austria 11.25 51.9 14.0 6.2 2.8 1.0 65 60 59.6 58.9 
US 5.07 71.4 51.6 28.3 16.3 6.4 65 65 65.0 62.9 
Germany 12.19 73.2 31.6 6.6 2.9 0.9 65 65 60.9 60.2 
Switzerland 13.12 80.2 55.6 15.3 8.2 2.7 65 63 66.6 63.2 
Sweden 11.55 82.2 60.9 - - - 65 65 63.5 62.0 
Net replacement rate by earnings level, men 
(e) 
Share of average pre-retirement net earnings 
Elderly dependency ratio 
(g) 
Country 0.5 0.75 1 1.5 2 2.5 
Payroll 
tax rate 
(f) 2002 2050 
Austria 91.2 93.4 93.2 93.5 79.3 63.2 22.80 22.9 54.9 
US 61.4 54.6 51.0 44.9 39.0 35.5 12.40 18.5 32.2 
Germany 61.7 66.6 71.8 79.2 67.0 54.2 19.50 26.3 49.1 
Switzerland 71.4 68.9 67.3 53.0 41.4 34.3 22.30 23.6 55.3 
Sweden 90.2 76.4 68.2 70.1 74.3 75.0 18.91 26.5 46.8 
 
Sources:  
(a) ILO, Social Security Expenditure Database, 2001 (1999 number for US). Available from 
http://ilo.org/dyn/sesame/ifpses.socialdbresexp, accessed August 15, 2006. 
 
(b) ILO, LABORSTA, Labor Force Survey, 2005. Available from http://laborsta.ilo.org, accessed August 16, 2006. 
 
(c) US Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World, Europe: 2004. SSA Publication Number 13-11801, 
September 2004. 
 
(d) OECD, Index of Statistical Variables, Official versus Effective Age 1997-2002. Available from 
http://oecd.org/dataoecd/32/21/36029941.html, accessed August 16, 2006. 
 
(e) OECD, Index of Statistical Variables, Old Age Pension Replacement Rate, Mandatory Pension Plans, Percentage of Individual Pre-
retirement net earnings 2005. Available from http://oecd.org/dataoecd/32/21/36029941.html, accessed August 16, 2006. 
 
(f) US Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World, Europe: 2004. SSA Publication Number 13-11801, 
September 2004. Numbers include tax rates for old age, survivor, and disability pensions. 
 
(g) OECD, Index of Statistical Variables, Age-dependency Ratio, defined as Population 65+/Population 15-64, projected 2050 numbers. 
Available from http://oecd.org/dataoecd/32/21/36029941.html, accessed August 16, 2006. 
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More alarming issues arise if we turn to labor force participation. While in younger 
age groups, labor force participation rates are in line with other countries, they are 
particularly low for older workers in Austria. In all age groups close to statutory retirement 
age, the major issue is a participation rate 20 to 30 percentage points lower than in 
comparable countries.3 In the age group of 55 to 59, the participation rate is only 51.9 
percent, sharply dropping to only 14.0 percent in the age group 60 to 65. In contrast, 
Sweden has labor force participation rates of 82.2 percent and 60.9 percent in the respective 
age groups. Also, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States have significantly higher 
labor force participation rates of older workers. Tu felix Austria, retire? Thus, this low 
participation rate turns out to be the most striking abnormality and the most important 
challenge for a reform of the Austrian pension system. Due to an extensive use of early 
retirement and the disability pension, there is a significant difference between statutory and 
real retirement age: As the mirror image of the low participation rate, Austrian men and 
women retire on average at ages 59.6 and 58.9, respectively. This happens long before the 
statutory - internationally non abnormal - retirement ages of 65 and 60, respectively, which 
significantly distinguishes Austria from other developed countries. 
Thus, Austria is a highly interesting object of research. It has an expensive pension 
system, even in comparison to similar economies. On the one hand, the major advantages of 
the PAYGO system are that Austria hardly has to deal with old age poverty, and that the 
labor market is relatively quickly cleared of old workers in order to give younger workers the 
opportunity of employment. On the other hand, even though the system is presently 
                                                 
3 Looking at younger ages shows no big deviation of Austrian labor force participation rates from 
other countries (ILO, LABORSTA, Labor Force Survey, 2005. Available from http://laborsta.ilo.org, accessed 
May 15, 2008). In the age group 40-44, Austria has a participation rate of 89 percent, Germany 89.6 percent, 
Sweden 90.6 percent, Switzerland 88.9 percent, and the US 84 percent. The rates for age group 45-49 are 87.4 
(Austria), 88.6 (Germany), 89.6 (Sweden), 90.1 (Switzerland), and 79.4 (US). 
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working relatively well, there is inevitable need for continued reform. Socioeconomic and 
political constraints suggest that raising labor force participation near retirement ages 
combined with labor market reforms is the single most important criterion for successful 
reform.
  
  
CHAPTER 2 
THE AUSTRIAN PENSION SYSTEM 
 
 A summary of the institutional features and recent reforms should provide an 
overview of the public retirement system in Austria. We will look at the way a retirement 
pension is calculated. Also, we need to know how this calculation changed by pension 
reforms. 
 
The Institutional Setup 
 
The Austrian public pension system for private sector workers is a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) system with a defined benefit plan. It is primarily an income maintenance 
program rather than a pure anti-poverty program. Its main objective is to preserve a person’s 
standard of living in old ages. The current pension system was implemented in 1955 for 
private sector workers by Austria (1955). There are different pension plans for civil servants, 
self-employed, farmers, miners, and notaries. Implicitly, the PAYGO pension plan is a two-
pillar system, jointly financed by employers and employees. For that reason, additional firm 
pension plans or private pension plans hardly exist in Austria. Any deficit is covered out of 
the federal budget. The following presentation of the institutional features is based on the 
legislation in Austria (1996). A comprehensive summary of European social security 
programs can be found in Administration (2004). 
 8 
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The pension formula for private sector workers consists of two components, 
pensionable income and the replacement rate. In the initial year of retirement a person 
receives a pension benefit according to 
 
,                             (1) Pension Benefit = Average Pensionable Income  Replacement Rate⋅
 
 
where average pensionable income is defined as 
 
1Average Pensionable Income = 
n
t t
t
Annual Gross Income Valuation Factor
n
=
⋅∑
.                     (2) 
 
 
Pensionable income is the average of the “n best income years”. Annual income for pension 
calculation is defined as the sum of gross earnings and unemployment compensation. 
Earnings or unemployment compensations in the year of retirement are not considered. 
There is an upper threshold for annual income that enters into the above formula. In 1998, 
this annual threshold was 42,732 Euros. In order to correct for inflation, pensionable 
income of each year is multiplied by a valuation factor according to Hauptverband (Various 
years-b).  
The second component of the pension formula, the replacement rate, is defined as 
 
Replacement Rate = Increment Factor Insurance Years⋅                                               (3) 
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The replacement rate increases by an increment factor for each year of pension insurance. In 
1998, the increment factor was 1.83 percentage points for the first 30 insurance years, and 
1.675 percentage points for any subsequent year. The maximum replacement is 80 percent in 
case of retirement at the statutory age or one of the early retirement options. The 
replacement rate decreases by an early retirement penalty if a person retires before the 
statutory age. If retirement is postponed beyond the statutory age, a bonus is added to the 
replacement rate. Average pensionable income is multiplied by the replacement rate which 
yields the annual gross pension benefit at the time of retirement. If a pension benefit falls 
below a certain threshold, a means-tested allowance can be claimed from the federal 
government. This increases the pension to a minimum benefit which was 8,131 Euros per 
year in 1998. Pensions are paid in 14 installments per year, 12 current month installments, 
and two allowances. Gross pension benefits are subject to an individual income tax and a 
health insurance contribution.  
There are generally four pathways to exit the labor force into retirement: the old-age 
pension, early retirement, the disability pension, and partial retirement. For old-age pensions, 
the statutory retirement age is 65 for men, and 60 for women. Eligibility additionally requires 
15 years of contributory service,4 or 15 years of insurance coverage in the last 30 years, or 25 
years of insurance coverage over the whole working life, what ever applies first.  
Early retirement is a special, however, frequently used case of old-age pensions. The 
conditions for receiving an early pension are either long contributory service, or 
unemployment, or reduced working capacity. Early retirement can be granted to men at a 
minimum age of 60 and women at a minimum age of 55. For early retirement due to long 
                                                 
4 The pension law distinguishes contributory and qualifying periods in insurance coverage. Typical 
examples of qualifying periods are military service and maternity leave. 
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contributory service, at least 37.5 years of insurance or 35 years of contributory service are 
required. Early retirement due to unemployment requires at least 12 months of 
unemployment in the last 15 months. Finally, early retirement due to reduced working 
capacity requires that a person cannot continue the work predominately pursued in the last 
15 years. 
Disability pensions are available before the early retirement ages. A person is eligible 
for a disability pension if his loss of earnings capacity is 50 percent or more compared to 
persons with a similar level of education. Also, he must have 5 years of contributions5 in the 
last 10 years, 25 years of insurance, or 15 years of contributions. If the disabled person is 
younger than 56.5, the number of insurance years for the replacement rate calculation is 
projected to that age. The maximum replacement rate is 60 percent of average pensionable 
income. All other regulations follow the old-age case.  
Partial retirement was implemented in 1993. Due to the very small number of 
workers6 using this form of retirement, it was discontinued in 2004. Instead, legislature 
introduced an old-age part time work program. Reduced hours of work and earnings 
combined with a wage subsidy should help reduce the costs of an older worker to a 
company, and therefore reduce old age unemployment. Workers do not make a lot of use of 
this program either. 
 To give an example of calculating pension benefits, let us look at a man aged 62 in 
1998 (table 2). His average pensionable income is Euros 25,000 which is the average of the 
15 best income years. The man is entitled for early retirement due to long contributory 
                                                 
5 Additional months of contributions are required from age 50. From age 57, the eligibility conditions 
are relaxed. 
 
6 In 1998, only 1,058 persons received a partial pension, until 2003, the number decreased sharply to 
337 persons. 
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service. Retiring in 1998 at the age of 62, he retires 3 years before the statutory retirement 
age of 65. During his life, he accumulated 43 insurance years. His replacement rate is 
calculated as follows. For the first 30 insurance years, he receives 54.9 percentage points (A), 
for the remaining 13 insurance years 21.775 percentage points (B). This would add up to a 
replacement rate of 76.675 percent. However, due to early retirement, his replacement rate 
reduces by 6 percentage points (C). The overall replacement rate is therefore 70.675% (A+B-
C). Average pensionable income times the replacement rate results in a gross pension benefit 
of Euros 17,668.75 (I x II) for the year 1998. 
 
 
Table 2. Case study: calculation of pension benefits (1998) 
Male person retiring in 1998  
Entitled for early retirement due to long contributory service  
62 years old in 1998, i.e., 3 years prior to statutory retirement age of 65  
43 insurance years  
  
I. Average pensionable income of best 15 years Euros 25,000
 
II. Replacement rate = A+B-C (max. 80%) 70.675%
A. First 30 insurance years: 30 x 1.83 = 54.9 
      B. Next 13 insurance years: 13 x 1.675 = 21.775 
                    C. Penalty for early retirement: 3 years x 2 = 6  
 
 
Gross pension benefits in 1998 = I x II Euros 17,668.75
  
 
Note: Example of pension calculation for a male person retiring in 1998. For the calculation of pension benefits, two components are 
required. First, we need average pensionable income of the best 15 income years. Second, we need the replacement rate. The product of 
both components results in before-tax pension benefits in the initial year of retirement. 
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Pension Reforms 
 
The pension system belongs to the most important government programs, since it 
greatly affects the standard of living of every citizen. Around the millennium, a couple of 
pension reforms were implemented. They were done in a very gradual way, reflecting the 
political constraints in Austria, and also the fact that the pension system is per se a very 
sensitive area. Which reforms took place, and which parameters in the pension system were 
changed?  
The main change of reform 1997 was a new treatment of the increment factors. 
However, parts of reform 1997 never became effective. A situation based on the pension law 
effective from 1997 to 2000 will throughout be called legislation 1997. Reform 1997, which 
was implemented in Austria (1997), brought the following novelties: 
• The increment factor in the replacement rate calculation increases from 1.675 
percentage points (1.83 percentage points in the first 30 insurance years) to uniquely 
2 percentage points per insurance year (effective January 1, 2000). The maximum 
replacement rate remains at 80 percent of average pensionable income. 
• Early retirement reduces the replacement rate by 2 percentage points per year of 
early retirement with an upper ceiling of 10 percentage points or 15 percent of the 
replacement rate (effective January 1, 2000). 
 
In the same year as reform 1997 became effective, the retirement law changed again. 
The reform affected the early retirement ages, the penalty for early retirement, and the 
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options for early retirement. A situation based on this reform will likewise be called 
legislation 2000. In particular, reform 2000 in Austria (2000) included the following changes: 
• Early retirement age is gradually raised from 60 to 61.5 for men, and from 55 to 56.5 
for women (effective October 1, 2000). 
• Early retirement reduces the replacement rate by 3 percentage points per year of 
early retirement with an upper ceiling of 10.5 percentage points overall or 15 percent 
of the replacement rate (effective October 1, 2000). 
• A bonus for postponing retirement beyond the statutory ages is increased from 2 
percentage points to 4 percentage points per year with an upper ceiling for the 
replacement rate of 90 percent (effective October 1, 2000). 
• There is one exception from reform 2000. Men born before October 1, 1945 and 
already having at least 45 contributory years, and women born before October 1, 
1950 and already having at least 40 contributory years, can still retire at early 
retirement ages and penalties according to the 1997 legislation. 
• Early retirement due to reduced working capacity is abolished. 
 
Though, the analysis in the following chapters does not include reform 2003, let us 
briefly look at it for the sake of completeness. Again, penalties for early retirement increased, 
and the access to early retirement was more restricted. In detail, reform 2003 changed the 
following in Austria (2003a) and in Austria (2003b): 
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• The assessment base for average pensionable earnings is increased from the “15 best 
years” gradually by 12 months for each year until it reaches the “40 best earnings 
years” in 2028 (effective January 1, 2004). 
• The increment factor in the replacement rate calculation decreases to 1.96 percentage 
points per insurance year (effective January 1, 2004), and even further in subsequent 
years. 
• Early retirement reduces the replacement rate by 4.2 percentage points per year of 
early retirement with an upper ceiling of 15 percent of the replacement rate. The 
deduction applies to a maximum replacement rate of 80 percent of less. The loss 
compared to legislation 2000 cannot exceed 5 percent in 2004, gradually increasing to 
10 percent in 2024 (effective January 1, 2004). 
• A bonus for postponing retirement beyond the statutory ages is increased to 4.2 
percentage points per year with an upper ceiling for the replacement rate of 91.76% 
(effective January 1, 2004). 
• Early retirement due to long contributory service and due to unemployment are 
abolished (effective July 1, 2004, and January 1, 2004, respectively). For cohorts born 
before October 1, 1952 (men) and before October 1, 1957 (women), these forms of 
early retirement are gradually abolished by an increase in the eligibility age until it 
reaches the statutory ages in 2014. 
 
Therefore, the changes of pension reform can be summarized as follows. All forms 
of early retirement were abolished. However, the phasing out period is very long, so 
immediate effects will be quite small. The minimum ages for early retirement changed by 
legislation 2000. They were raised from 60 to 61.5 for men, and from 55 to 56.5 for women. 
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The replacement rate altered in two ways. First, the increment factor for each year of 
insurance rose from 1.83 (1.675) to 2 percentage points. Second, the penalty for each year of 
early retirement rose from 2 to 3 percentage points. This implies a higher replacement rate of 
legislation 2000 compared to legislation 1997. Table 3 shows that the calculation of pension 
benefits according to legislation 2000 results in a replacement rate of 77 percent. Compared 
to table 2 which is based on legislation 1997, this is an increase of 6.325 percentage points. 
Thus, reform 2000 increased the generosity of the pension system. Reform 2003 tried to 
“repair” this situation. However, pension reform increased penalties for early retirement. 
This is the right direction to a system of more actuarial fairness. The steps-by-step strategy in 
pension reform on the one hand minimizes the financial effects on the system. Further 
reform is needed. So, on the other hand, the long gradual reform process generates a lot of 
uncertainty among persons approaching the retirement age. Also, younger persons question 
the reliability of their old age income out of the public pension system in far future. 
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Table 3. Case study: calculation of pension benefits (2001) 
Male person retiring in 2001  
Entitled for early retirement due to long contributory service  
62 years old in 2001, i.e., 3 years prior to statutory retirement age of 65  
43 insurance years  
  
I. Average pensionable income of best 15 years Euros 25,000
 
II. Replacement rate = A-C (max. 80%) 77%
A. 43 insurance years: 43 x 2 = 86 
                  C. Penalty for early retirement: 3 years x 3 = 9 
                     
 
 
Gross pension benefits in 1998 = I x II Euros 19,250
  
 
Note: Example of pension calculation for a male person retiring in 2001. For the calculation of pension benefits, two components are 
required. First, we need average pensionable income of the best 15 income years. Second, we need the replacement rate. The product of 
both components results in before-tax pension benefits in the initial year of retirement.
  
  
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The relevant literature on retirement behavior and the financial incentives to retire 
comes from three sources. First, from the literature on labor supply of older workers, 
second, from the literature on the financial incentives driving retirement behavior. For 
control variables, literature on other determinants of the retirement decision like health or 
family status is important. 
In order to theoretically determine retirement behavior, we need a model that 
features a lifetime perspective. The standard framework on labor supply of older workers 
bases on the idea that individuals optimize their economic decisions over a lifetime horizon. 
Technically, this implies that individuals maximize lifetime utility subject to a lifetime wealth 
constraint. From a history of economic thought perspective, these models ground on the 
Life Cycle Hypothesis by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), as well as the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis by Friedman (1957). Dealing with retirement behavior, Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1986) propose a life cycle model in which an individual maximizes the present value in 
utility of consumption and leisure subject to a present value lifetime budget constraint. This 
approach is an extension of the basic model of labor-leisure choice in a multi-period setting. 
Many versions of this model exist throughout the literature, either in discrete or in 
continuous time.  
In the newer literature, Stock and Wise (1990) introduce a reduced form approach. 
They propose a model in which the option value of future earnings and pension benefits is 
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maximized. Retirement takes place in the period that yields the maximum option value. The 
motivation for the option value approach comes from Lazear (1979), who finds that a 
worker retires when his wage does not anymore exceed his value marginal product of labor. 
Both approaches are complements rather than substitutes, therefore the reduced option 
value approach can easily be integrated into a more comprehensive life cycle approach.  
Samwick (1998) introduces a life cycle model of consumption and the endogenous 
date of retirement, and shows how the option value aspect is included in the first order 
condition for the retirement date. Building upon that, the theoretical model extends the 
Samwick analysis by using parameters that describe the Austrian situation. 
There are many factors driving the retirement decision. In the empirical literature, 
financial incentives of retirement are the key variables in the retirement decision. The usual 
incentive measures are social security wealth, the accrual in social security wealth, the peak 
value, the option value, and the implicit tax on work (see chapters 4 and 5 definitions). 
However, also coordination among older couples, health and disability, institutional 
rigidities, care giving, and labor demand for older workers bear substantive implications on 
retirement behavior.  
An extensive international comparison of retirement incentives embedded in the 
public pension plans of selected OECD countries is provided in Gruber and Wise (1999). In 
their very influential study, they analyzed the impact of financial incentives coming out of 
pension systems using macro data. However, their project did not include Austria. They 
found that there is a very strong causality across all countries between the financial 
incentives of pension plans and the labor force exit of older workers. Moreover, all of the 
countries bear an implicit tax on work in their pension systems such that many individuals 
retire before the statutory retirement ages. Regressing unused labor force capacity on the log 
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of tax force to retire, they found a strikingly high relationship with . As two points 
of caution for their result, they first emphasize that each social security system encourages 
retirement at certain ages in order to provide more jobs for younger workers. Second, early 
retirement is often deliberately used as an instrument against old age unemployment. This 
study provides a comprehensive methodology to calculate the financial incentive measures. 
2 0.82R =
An important study to compare the behavior of Austrian workers to other countries 
is Gruber and Wise (2004). In this second stage of their project, they perform a micro-
estimation of the link between the probability of retirement and the financial incentives. 
They use the same sample of OECD countries as in their first stage. Their results show an 
empirically very strong relationship between financial incentives and the retirement behavior 
across all countries. Under these country studies Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2004) did the 
Canadian part;  Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) treated Italy; Boersch-Suppan et al. (2004) 
Germany; Coile and Gruber (2004) the United States. Applying a synchronized 
methodology, the county papers used probit models in order to explain the probability of 
retirement as a function of financial incentives and a set of controls. They estimated 
equations separate by sex for each of the incentive measures. Then, they use the estimates to 
perform policy simulations. Also, they show that with this kind of subject, strong 
assumptions have to be made frequently, because micro data usually do not give information 
about complete individual lifetime income histories. Austria is often left out in international 
comparative studies. However, it is a very interesting country in many areas: the long 
tradition of early retirement, the frequent use of disability pensions, the unique one pillar 
system, and the different legal retirement ages for men and women. Gruber and Wise (2004) 
show that the features of pension plans vary largely form country to country. Therefore, this 
study analyzes the Austrian case using a detailed administrative micro-data set. 
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To control for factors different from the financial incentives in the retirement 
decision, the following studies are of interest as well. Other factors include coordination 
among couples, the health condition, institutional rigidities, care giving in the family, and 
various demographic characteristics. Blau (1998) investigates the coordination among 
couples on the retirement decision. They find evidence of joint retirement, leading to the 
conclusion of preferences for sharing leisure as an important consideration among couples. 
Rust (1989) and Sammartino (1987) draw their attention on the health status of retirees, and 
find evidence of poor health encouraging early retirement. Hurd (1996) deals with 
institutional rigidities that encourage retirement, like hours of work restrictions, cost of older 
labor, and age discrimination. However, these ideas have not been empirically fully 
investigated. Another important consideration is care giving in the family as a reason to quit 
a job. Gorey, Rice, and Brice (1992) show that up to a third of informal care giving leads to 
labor market exit. Gruber and Wise (2004) furthermore use controls for expected earnings 
next year, lifetime earnings, education, race, experience, industry, occupation, and region. 
These contributions help me find the important variables and controls for the estimations. 
Some of them are, however, not available in the data used, for instance marriage status. 
For the Austrian case, the literature on pensions in general and on financial 
incentives in particular is relatively thin. Some papers have been published recently. A 
summary on recent pension reforms including a numerical evaluation is provided by 
Buczolich et al. (2003). Also, a policy evaluation on recent pension reforms is found in 
Mayrhuber (2003). The paper most closely related to this study is Hofer and Koman (2006). 
Methodologically, they follow the first stage of the Gruber and Wise (1999) project. For 
some stylized cases, they calculate accrual rates and levels of social security wealth, as well as 
implicit tax rates on continued work. They conclude that the financial incentives coming out 
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of the Austrian public pension system bear huge incentives for early retirement. This study 
will expand their work using a detailed micro-data set in order to micro estimate the 
response of Austrians to changes in the financial incentives. Also, an important feature of 
this dissertation is to look at behavioral differences between men and women. Then, this 
study uses the estimates to simulate past and future reform scenarios, including pension 
reform 2000. Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2004) simulate some scenarios of Austrian 
pension reform, finding that lowering the replacement rate or decreasing the retirement age 
can have strong labor market effects. This study is going to add a micro-estimation of the 
impact of financial incentives on the retirement probability and policy simulations using the 
estimates. 
  
  
CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 We are specifying a model that predicts the influence of financial incentives on the 
date of retirement. Therefore, we will show how the financial incentives to retire fit into a 
life cycle model. Next, we have to identify an optimality condition for retirement. Using this 
optimality condition, we finally look at how the optimal date of retirement changes as a 
response to an exogenous increase in the financial incentive measures. 
 
A Life Cycle Model of Consumption and the Date of Retirement 
 
The natural framework to deal with retirement behavior is a life cycle model. 
Basically, we are following the analysis proposed by Samwick (1998), however, extend the 
model by adding taxes, individual and institutional parameters. Workers are assumed to 
maximize utility over the life-cycle subject to a lifetime budget constraint. Pensions are 
financed by a proportional payroll tax τ  in the working part of life, and paid to retirees. The 
level of pension benefits received after retirement depends on the calculation formula for 
pension benefits defined by the social security law. The pension system is a PAYGO-system, 
where benefits do not depend on the tax rate on earnings. Capital markets are perfectly 
competitive, so that individuals can borrow and lend at an exogenous market interest rate r. 
Finally, there is no bequest motive, so individuals will have zero net wealth at the end of 
their life. 
 23 
 24
An individual is born at time s = 0, retires at time s = R, and dies at time s = T. It 
receives work income before R, and a pension benefit after R. It maximizes lifetime utility 
 
{ } ( ) ( )( ) ( ),max ,0 ,1s
R T
s t s tW R
sR C
t R
e u C ds e u Cδ δ− − − −+∫ ∫ s ds
( ) ( )) ,
T T
r s t r s t
t s s s
t R t
SSW
A e m Y ds e B R ds e C dsτ − − − −− + Θ =∫ ∫ ∫
	

.                (5) 
 
argument in the utility function represents the effect of retirement leisure on utility. 
                                                  (4) 
 
 
subject to a lifetime wealth constraint 
 
 ( )(1
R
r s t− −+ − ( )
( )u =i Utility function, which is order preserving, increasing, continuous, regular 
strictly quasi-concave and time separable in the endogenous argument. The second 
( ), 0W su C =Utility during working periods. 
( ),1R = Utility during retirement periods. su C
= Consumption in period s, s = 0,…, R,…, T. 
Endogenous date of retirement. 
sC
R =
δ = Rate of time preference. 
= Net wealth at time t. 
= Disc
tA
r ount rate. 
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( , )sB R Θ = Net pension benefits received in period s, 0sBR
∂ >∂ , and 
2
0sB
R
∂ ≡∂ . 
Θ = Exogenous parameter vector of individual characteristics affecting pension 
2
benefits, such as poor health. Since individuals with these characteristics usually 
retire before the normal retirement age and get a lower pension benefit, we assume 
that 0RB∂ < . ∂Θ
s Gross real income from work in period Y = s. 
Proportional income tax rate. m =
τ = Proportional payroll tax rate. 
er 
ealth streams. The measures for the incentives to 
retire are explicitly imbedded in the model and are used in the empirical part in order to 
determ
 
The Financial Incentives to Retire 
 
Retirement behavior is largely determined by financial incentives that come eith
out of the pension system or from labor force participation. An individual will compare 
future wealth streams coming out of different sources, and then decide which date of 
retirement R maximizes these future w
ine the respective magnitudes. 
Social Security Wealth is defined as ( ) ( , )
T
r s t
R
SSW e B R ds− − s= Θ∫ . This is the present 
discounted value of net pension benefits paid to an individual out of the pension system. 
Persons with a greater SSW are more likely to retire than persons with a smaller SSW. 
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The Accrual  is ( ) ( )
T
r s t r R ts
R
SSW B
R R
− − − −∂ ∂
∂ ∂
the increment in SSW by postponing
( , ) ( , )RACC e R ds e B R= = Θ − Θ∫ . It represents 
 retirement. This is in other words just the marginal 
benefit from postponing retirement. Th r, 
t not 
 complete future path of the ACCs. 
nings 
age earnings as well as social 
security .  
g 
e magnitude of the ACC might vary with every yea
and even be negative. Thus, just looking at a single year ACC might not be sufficient; it has 
to be determined for each and every year of retirement eligibility. Furthermore, he migh
only look ahead one year at the ACC, but at the
The Peak Value ( *PV ACC s=  is the maximum accrual that can be obtained by 
postponing retirement to s*. So far, these incentive measures are just including the benefits 
received out of the pension system. However, an individual might also consider future 
earnings from work in his retirement decision. 
The Option Value is defined as τ− −= − − +( )(1 )r R t ROV e m Y ACC . This is ear
from continued work and the gain or loss in so
An individual retiring later, he will gain or loose from future w
)
cial security wealth by postponing retirement. 
 benefits. The OV can also be interpreted as the price of leisure as shown below
The person compares the SSW from retiring now at age t with the gains or losses of retirin
at a later time. The incentive prediction is that an individual would retire if 0OV ≤ . 
However, the OV measure does not take account of different tastes concerning work and 
leisure. 
The Implicit Social Security Tax on Work, ( )( ) (1 )r R t R
ACCIST
e m Y
= − , is the ratio τ− − − − of 
gains or losses in SSW compared to earnings if retirement is delayed. So, by postponing 
retirement for one more year, an individual might expect the increase in social security 
wealth to be positive or at least non-negative, because he foregoes one year of social security 
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benefits. This is the case if t ber and Wise (1999) call 
is benefit structure “actuarially fair”. If the accrual is negative, then the individual’s gains in 
earning , the implicit tax on 
work. Thus, an actuarially fair structure of benefits implies 
he SSW is at least non-decreasing. Gru
th
s are partially or fully offset by a loss in social security wealth
0SSW
R
∂ ≥∂ . 
ent 
 
The Optimal Date of Retirem
 
The Lagrangian for the above problem (4) subject to (5) is 
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A r δ= , we take the first order 
conditions with respect to R7 and 
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7  Leibnitz’s Rule on differentiation under the integral: If
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( ), 0W s
s s
u CL s R
C C
λ∂∂ = = ∀ <∂ ∂ , and                                                                      (8) 
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s s
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to retire, implicitly defining the optimal date of retirement . The left-hand side of (7) is the 
C C∂ ∂  ) 
 
The first order condition with respect to R in (7) represents the immediate incentive 
difference in utility that results from a marginal increase in the retirement date. The right-
hand side of the equation represents the utility change of wealth resulting from a marginal 
increase in the retirement date. The term in brackets is the price of leisure, in other words 
abor force participation. 
8) and (9) implicitly define the Frisch or 
*R
the option value OV of continued l
 ( λ -constant demand functions for 
consumption. The Lagrangian multiplier λ  can be 
(8) and (9) imply that
interpreted as marginal utility of wealth, 
0λ > . The first order conditions with respect to  state that the 
arginal utility of consumption at date s is equal to the marginal utility of wealth. From (8) 
d (9), we get the Frisch demand functions s
sC
m
* ( )s sC C λ= ∀an , and therefore (7) becomes 
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For a maximum, it is required that 
 
( )2 0
T
r s RR s
R
F B Be r ds
R R R
λ − −⎡ ⎤∂ ∂= − + <∂ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∫
 
rement behavior or more precisely the 
optimal date of retirement alters wh
the crucial role of the Lagrangian multiplier 
∂⎣ ⎦
                                                          (11) 
 
Comparative Statics Analysis 
 
We are interested in the question how reti
en the parameters of the model are changed. Because of 
λ  in this kind of model, we have to take a closer 
look at it. An extensive discussion on λ  can be found in MaCurdy (1981).  While 
Marshallian demand functions hold income constant, and Hicksian demand functions hold 
utility constant, Frisch demand functions are holding marginal utility of wealth λ  constant. 
Consumption decisions at a point in time are related to variables outside that point in time 
only through λ , which also influences the retirement decision, as the relationship in (10) 
shows. So, λ  summarizes all information about lifetime wealth, assets, income and tastes the 
individual requires determining the optimal current period consumption. In other words, it 
captures the effect of an increase in the present value of lifetime wealth on maximized 
lifetime utility. But what does an increase in λ  mean? From (8), we get * 0sC λ∂ ∂ < .8 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (5), we get 
                                                 
8 Using (8) and the Implicit Function Theorem, 
2
*
* *1 0
W
s
s s
F F uC
C C
λ λ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ = − = − − <⎜ ⎟ ⎜∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ 2
⎞⎟⎠
 because of diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption. 
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0, 0, 0
t s sA Y B
λ λ λ∂ ∂ ∂< < <  ∂ ∂ ∂
9                                                                               (12) 
 
Thus, a decrease in income or wealth from various sources causes an increase in λ . 
Intuitively this is plausible, because an additional Euro in wealth or income would add more 
utility if wealth or income is very low as opposed to adding less utility as wealth or income is 
very high. 
 Since λ  summarizes all intertemporal changes, all parameter changes can be 
expressed by λ . The intuition about such changes is that they are unanticipated and 
permanent, for instance a permanent change in the lifetime income profile or a permanent 
change in the profile of pension benefits. Such a permanent change will cause a substitution 
effect and a wealth effect. For the op l 
increase in 
tima date of retirement *R , described in (10), an 
λ  leads to an ambiguous sign in (13). This is an important finding, because it tells 
us that any intertemporal influence on the retirement decision depends on the sign of the 
ption value OV only. The individual will delay retirement if the OV is positive, i.e., if the 
individual can expect a gain in future wealth streams from postponing retirement compared 
to retiring now. 
o
                                                 
9 Using (5) and (8), and the Implicit Function Theorem, we get 
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h. Therefore, this kind of changes only causes substitution 
effects. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (10), we get the following comparative 
statics predictions changes in parameters: 
The optimal date of retirement  is increasing in the accrual 
 
So far, we have been looking at permanent changes that have an influence on *R . 
However, we also want to look at temporary or anticipated changes that do not affect the 
overall marginal utility of wealt
*R ACC, since 
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An increase in the accr nd therefore makes 
individuals postpone retirement. Furthermore, the optimal date of retirement is 
increasing in the option va
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Similarly, as the price of leisure is increased, individuals will postpone retirement. 
The optimal date of retirement is increasi
 
*R  ng in net income Y , since R
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igher income  increases the price of leisure, so individuals postpone retirement. 
An exogen s increase in the payroll tax 
                                                     (16) 
 
 RYH
ou  the proportional income tax m  or an increase in 
τ makes an individual shift the optimal date of r point in time, since retirement to an earlie
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An increase in the income or payroll taxes would decrease net income of individuals, 
and therefore decrease the price of leisure. The optimal date of retirement  is decreasing 
in net p
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Again, an increase in net pension benefits decreases the price of leisure and makes 
individuals retire earlier. Moreover, the optimal date of retirement *R  is increasing in life 
expectancy T, since 
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Finally, the negative effect of an increase
                                                        (20) 
 in poor health or an increase in the degree 
of disability on the optimal date of retirement *R is 
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Comparative statics shows that unanticipated permanent changes in wealth or 
income have an ambiguous effect on the optimal date of retirement . This ambiguity 
depends on the sign of the option value OV. Permanent changes are causing wealth and 
F B
−
∂ ∂
*R
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substitution effects. Anticipated or temporary changes have an unambiguous effect on *R . 
They only cause a substitution effect. Theoretically, financial incentives play a crucial r n 
the retirement decision. 
The focus of this study is on the financial incentives that drive retirement. Th
questions of interest are: How do financial incentives embedded in the Austrian pension 
system affect individual retirement behavior? Was pension reform effective in changing 
these financial incentives? How would future reform scenarios impact retirement behavi
Therefore, we are deriving predictions for empirically testable hypotheses for these 
questions. This model discussed above explains the optimal date of retirement. In the 
empirical specification in the following chapters, we will however use the probability of 
retirement as the endogenous variable of interest. This means for any comparative statics 
predictions that a positive effect on the date of retirement is equivalent to a negative effect 
on the probability of retirement and vice versa. 
Hypothesis 1: An anticipated increase in one of the accrual measures10 (ACC, PV ) 
increases the price of retirement leisure.11 Therefore, the date of retirement R* is postponed. 
This is the same as decreasing the probability of retirement.  
Hypothesis 2: An unexpected increase in the profile of lifetime wealth as for instance 
induced by a pension reform has an ambiguous effect on the date of retirement. The ef
composed of a negative wealth effect and a positive accrual effect. This is equivalent to a positive 
wealth effect and a negative accrual effect on the probability of retirement. The direction of the 
impact depends on the relative magnitudes of these two effects.
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10 Also, the IST is an accrual measure. However, it is defined as a (negative) tax rate. Therefore, an 
increase in ACC is equivalent to a decrease in IST. So, the probability of retirement increases as the IST goes 
up. 
 
11 There is no or only a very small wealth effect associated with anticipated changes. 
  
  
CHAPTER 5 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
 In order to estimate the impact of the financial incentives on retirement probabilities, 
we have to look at the data and empirical strategy. Therefore, we are going to discuss the 
data used, the sample selection, summary statistics, the treatment of income histories, the 
construction and age profiles of the incentive variables, and the regression method. 
 
The Data 
 
We are using the detailed administrative Databank (2006) containing micro data on 
4,975,624 individuals, i.e., the whole labor force in Austria. The data mainly comes from 
administrative records of the Austrian Social Security Administration. Therefore, the format 
of the data is insurance spells and earnings career spells. The time frame of the earnings 
records is 1997 to 2004.  
Variables available in the data base are 
• Labor market variables: Insurance status at social security administration (e.g., 
employed, retired) and labor market status (e.g., employee, worker, public servant, 
unemployed). 
• Individual attributes: anonymized individual identification numbers, sex, year of 
birth, citizenship, academic degree, and date of death (unfortunately, citizenship has a lot of 
missing values). 
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• Earnings variables: gross earnings distinguishing between current earnings and 
allowances. 
• Employer attributes: Firm establishment ID, founding year of firm, sector of 
firm activity (NACE-code), and territorial location of firm activity (NUTS-code). 
The data is relatively comprehensive and offers a great deal of detail to researchers. 
However, at the same time there are some shortcomings. First, there is no information on 
marriage status of a person, which would be useful in order to control for a couple’s joint 
retirement decision. Second, there is no data on individual’s whole lifetime income history, 
only the constrained time frame earnings are available. Therefore, we have to construct 
income histories for the purpose of calculating average pensionable income according to the 
pension formula. Also, we have to make assumption on the labor force entry of a person, 
since the replacement rate depends on the number of insurance years. Third, the data only 
contains information about earnings from work. Pension benefits are missing. Fourth, no 
information on property and non-work related income is available, which would be helpful 
to control for.  
Thus, the data is appropriate for testing the hypotheses, but it does not include all of 
the features and control variables suggested in the literature on retirement behavior. In order 
to correct for these omitted variables, we are using a fixed effects estimator. Also, some 
assumptions about an individual’s income career are required. To minimize a bias coming 
from measurement errors in the income histories and the variables derived from them, a 
fixed effects estimator is the best choice as well. 
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Sample Selection 
 
For the purpose of a panel regression, the spell-duration format of the data requires 
the transformation into a person-year format. From the original data universe, we are taking 
a twenty percent random sample. We only consider individuals who participate in the labor 
force. Persons who reenter the labor force after their first retirement are also dropped. Then, 
we exclude persons not employed in the private sector, i.e., farmers, civil servants, self-
employed. We also exclude widowers and orphans due to special taxation rules and special 
earnings patterns. Furthermore, we are dropping workers with more than two years of 
unemployment. Since earnings histories have to be reconstructed backwards beyond 1997 
for pension benefit calculation purposes, we exclude persons who did not work or were 
already retired in 1997. Also, we are dropping persons who did not retire in any of the years 
between 1998 and 2004. 
A comparison between the original sample and the sample used in the further 
analysis is in table 4. The original sample refers to the same birth cohorts and age groups as 
the sample used. Year of observation, birth year, and death year are therefore almost 
identical. Individuals in the original sample are on average older, because also post-
retirement years are included. Gross earnings are higher in the sample used than in the 
original sample. This reflects the fact that the original sample contains post-retirement part-
time workers, civil servants, farmers, and persons with very rudimentary earnings times. All 
of these groups typically have lower earnings than employees in the private sector. The same 
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groups also usually have less sick days. Also, the Health variable is smaller in the original 
sample because post retirement years are included. 
The resulting data sets for males and females used in the regressions are person-year 
observations over the time interval 1998 to 2003. The first and the last years of the 
individual observations are used in the variable calculation. However, they are lost in the 
regression, since we have to look forward one year in the accrual calculation, and one year 
backwards in the earnings history reconstruction. The male panel consists of 20,612 persons 
with 75,494 observations and the average observation duration of 3.7 years. The female 
panel consists of 15,108 persons with 47,153 observations, and the average observation 
duration of 3.1 years. The female panel is restricted to ages up to age 60, because the legal 
retirement ages are earlier than for males.  Birth years range from 1938 through 1945. This 
implies that in 1998, a person is between 53 and 60 years of age. In 2003, individuals are 
between 58 and 65 years of age. 
 
 
Table 4. Difference original sample and sample used 
 Means of men Means of women 
Variable Original sample Sample used Original sample Sample used
Year of obs. 2000.483 1999.74 2000.143 1999.341
Birth year 1941.775 1941.733 1942.917 1942.934
Death year 2094.94 2095.167 2097.701 2098.196
Gross earnings 16,066 25,288 8,959 14,441
Allowances 2,683 4,094 1,914 2,239
Age 58.708 58.007 57.226 56.407
Health 0.014 0.032 0.009 0.015
Obs. 280,775 75,494 153,283 47,153
Individuals 47,383 20,612 32,151 15,108
 
Notes: Table compares means of some characteristics between the original sample and the sample used in the analysis. Identical birth 
cohorts and age groups are compared. Variables are defined intuitively, monetary variables are nominal. Allowances are extra earnings paid 
for Christmas and vacation purposes, usually in the amount of two additional salaries. Health is the share of sick days relative to labor force 
participation. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
The following summary statistics are based on persons per year, since every person 
has a unique observation in a year. Also, means of all observations over all years are 
discussed. Tables of descriptive statistics are in the appendix, table A2.1 for the male sample 
and A.2.2 for the female sample. Retirement incentives are discussed in the following 
sections. 24 percent of male and 27 percent of female observations are initial retirement 
years. Since earlier years of the panels include earlier ages, the share of initial retirement years 
increases in the year of the observation. Both sexes show a slight reduction in the share of 
retirement after reform 2000, i.e., from year 2000 to 2001. The mean retirement year is 2001 
for both sexes. Females earn roughly 68 percent of male net earnings, and moreover 
accumulate pensionable earnings of only 59 percent of the average level for males. These 
shares stay relatively constant over years 1998 through 2003. The distribution of the age 
dummies shows the stepwise drop out of younger ages and addition of older ages over time. 
This represents the cohort structure of the sample.  The share of sick days during labor force 
activity is 3.2 percent of males and 1.8 percent of females. Also, this number stays relatively 
constant over the years. 45.8 percent of male and 15.8 percent of female observations are 
reported as work in the production sector as opposed to working in the services sector or 
being out of the labor force, again with not big changes over time. Male blue collar workers 
represent 41.4 percent of the observations, females only 30.3 percent. Roughly 26 percent of 
both sexes are working in Vienna, between 14 percent (males) and 11 percent (females) in 
Eastern Austria, 11 percent work in Southern Austria, the remainder in Western Austria. 
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These location shares also stay relatively constant over time. The mean year of observation is 
1999 for both sexes. 
The share of retirees of each age group given that one not already retired in table 5 
shows some striking behavioral differences between men and women. On average, men 
retire at age 59, women at age 57. For men, the early retirement option becomes available at 
age 60, for women at age 55. The statutory retirement ages are 65 for men and 60 for 
women. Before early retirement, only a disability pension is available. Men are using the early 
retirement option more frequently than women. One year before the statutory retirement 
age, 22.6 percent of men and only 13.2 percent of women retire. These huge differences 
remain through all ages before statutory retirement age. Moreover, women are making 
largely less use of a disability pension than men. One year before early retirement becomes 
available, 12.3 percent of men, but only 1.7 percent of females retire on a disability pension. 
Also, these differences persist through all ages that only allow retirement on a disability 
pension. This suggests that women are much more adapting their retirement behavior to the 
legal scheme of retirement ages than men. A possible reason might be that men are working 
in more health deteriorating jobs than women. Also, the later legal retirement ages and the 
shorter life expectancy might discourage men to stay in the labor force until age 65. Men 
would also want to coordinate retirement decisions with their wives. Moreover, it is often 
criticized that disability pensions are granted too generously in Austria.12 Thus, different 
retirement ages for men and women seem to induce effects on retirement behavior. 
                                                 
12 In Germany, disability pensions are also granted very generously. According to Boersch-Suppan, 
Axel, Reinhold Schnabel, Simone Kohnz, and Giovanni Mastrobuoni. 2004. Micro-modeling of retirement 
decisions in Germany. In Social security programs and retirement around the world: Micro estimation, ed. Jonathan 
Gruber and David A. Wise:285-344. Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 29 percent of German private 
sector workers retire on a disability pension, while only 20 percent of them retire statutorily. Moreover, 40 
percent of German civil servants enter retirement on a disability pension. 
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Reform 2000 unintendedly increased the share of early retirees at each age for both 
sexes. Moreover, there is a sharp increase in male disability pensioners following reform 
2000. This suggests that retirees evade into the disability pensions since there is no minimum 
age requirement for this option. 
 
 
Table 5. Percentage of retirees, by sex and age 
Males Females 
Age Base case 
Pre reform 
2000 
Post reform 
2000 Base case 
Pre reform 
2000 
Post reform 
2000 
53 0.058 0.058  0.015 0.015  
54 0.053 0.053  0.017 0.017  
55  0.071 0.071  0.431 0.431  
56 0.071 0.068 0.109 0.315 0.295 0.435
57 0.194 0.182 0.241 0.202 0.177 0.263
58 0.174 0.159 0.209 0.178 0.155 0.211
59 0.123 0.121 0.126 0.132 0.133 0.131
60 0.558 0.631 0.468 0.708 0.626 0.775
61 0.661 0.563 0.709    
62 0.440 0.323 0.478    
63 0.335  0.335    
64 0.226  0.226    
65 0.789  0.789    
 
Notes: Table shows the share of retirees of an age group given that one not already retired. For males and females, three cases are 
distinguished: the base case representing the whole panel from 1998 to 2003, the panel pre reform 2000, and the panel after 
reform 2000. The statutory retirement age is 65/60 (men/women), the minimum early retirement age is 60/55 (men/women). 
Before early retirement, the only retirement option is a disability pension. 
 
 
 
Treatment of Income Histories and Pension Benefit Calculation 
 
In order to calculate pension benefits and the financial incentives to retire, we need 
an income history of each person. The time frame of the data is not long enough for a 
complete income history. Also, there is no data on pension benefits and unemployment 
compensation, only gross earnings from 1997 to 2004 are available. Pension benefits are 
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calculated according to the pension formula in chapter 2. They depend on the average 
pensionable income of the best 15 income years. Also, they depend on a replacement rate. 
So, we have to impute the income data necessary to calculate pension benefits. 
Pensionable income consists of earnings from work, but also of unemployment 
compensation. There are 4 different cases for the treatment of earnings and unemployment 
compensation in a person’s income history: 
The first case is the treatment of years before the data window 1997 to 2004. We are 
imputing earnings and unemployment compensation 15 years backwards from year 1997. 
Using the earnings in 1997 as the base, pre-1997 earnings are assumed to grow at the annual 
aggregate growth rate of nominal earnings13 as found in Databank (2007a). Then, for each 
year pre-1997, we calculate the amount of pensionable unemployment compensation. 
Weighing earnings and unemployment compensation by a predicted share of being 
unemployed for each person results in the amount of pensionable income (see appendix 1 
for the method to predict the share of unemployment at a certain age). 
The second case is the treatment of observed data in working years from 1997 to 
2004. Earnings are observed, unemployment compensations are not. The pensionable 
unemployment compensation is calculated and prorated for the observed time of 
                                                 
13 In order to determine the growth of earnings as age increases, we have to look at the age earnings 
profile in Austria. In contrast to many OECD countries, salaries in Austria grow according to seniority until 
retirement. This implies an age-earnings profile strictly increasing in age rather than being concave in age near-
retirement as described on page 129 in OECD. 2005. Ageing and Employment Policies: Austria. Paris: OECD. Also, 
all wage increases are bargained on the federal level by labor unions and employer organizations of an industry. 
Consequently, all employees in an industry will have an identical salary growth rate each year. Under these 
circumstances, the “best 15 years” for pension computation are most likely to be the last 15 years before 
retirement. We will therefore, adopting the method portrayed in Brugiavini, Agar, and Franco Peracchi. 2004. 
Micro-modeling of retirement behavior in Italy. In Social security programs and retirement around the world: Micro 
estimation, ed. Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise:345-398. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. and on page 
300 in Hofer, Helmut, and Reinhard Koman. 2006. Social security and retirement incentives in Austria. 
Empirica 33, no. 5: 285-313., assume that earnings pre-1997 and prospective future earnings between 1998 and 
2004 grow at the annual aggregate growth rate of earnings as found in Databank. 2007a. Austrian Chamber of 
Commerce: Pro-Kopf-Einkommen der Arbeitnehmer [Per capita income of employees]. Available from 
www.wko.at/Extranet/Langzeit/Lang-Einkommen.pdf, accessed July 1, 2007. 
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unemployment. Following the pension law, unemployment times in a particular year enter 
into the pension formula by the amount of 70 percent of the previous year’s gross earnings. 
For unemployment times exceeding 52 weeks, only 92 percent of the latter amount count as 
pensionable income. Both components, earnings and pensionable unemployment 
compensation, add up to pensionable income for one year. 
Third, there is a special treatment of the retirement year. In case someone retires in a 
year after working parts of this year, the pre-retirement earnings are projected to a whole 
year’s earnings. In case someone retires on January 1st, his potential earnings in the 
retirement year are projected forward from the earnings in the year before retirement. 
Fourth, we need projected earnings from the last working year until year 2004. 
Adopting the same method as sooner in the backwards earnings calculation, the earnings 
after the last working year grow at the annual aggregate growth rate of nominal earnings. 
However, after as soon as retirement is observed, it is irrational to be unemployed. A worker 
would rather retire before he becomes unemployed. He would only look at prospective 
future earnings from work. Therefore, we are not projecting pensionable unemployment 
compensation for these years. 
For the calculation of the replacement rate according to the pension formula, we 
need the number of insurance years of a person. However, the age of labor force entry is 
unknown. Therefore, considering the economic activity rates by sex in 1950 as described in 
Databank (2007c), this study will assume that all men start their insurance career at the age 
of 20, and all women at the age of 17.14
                                                 
14 An investigation of average statutory retirement ages in 1998 in the data supports this assumption: 
going back 45 years from the mean age of retirement by sex results in the maximum replacement rate if 
insurance careers started at ages 20 and 17, respectively. 
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Another problem of identification arises from individuals exempt from reform 2000. 
It is observable, that people who retired at ages 55/60 (females/males) in 2001, 2002, and 
2003 are exempt from reform 2000. If they were not exempt, they would not have been able 
to take an early retirement pension at ages 55/60, since reform 2000 increased the early 
retirement ages to 56.5/61.5. However, it is not clear if people who retired in ages later than 
55/60 in that time frame were exempt from reform 2000 or not. This study is treating them 
as exempt, because they could have already retired at the earliest age possible. However, this 
might give rise to a bias in the estimates. 
In order to calculate earnings and pension benefits net of all taxes, we are using the 
Austrian payroll and personal income taxation regulations (appendix 1).  
 
Social Security Wealth 
 
The main variables of interest are the financial incentives of retirement. Once 
becoming eligible for retirement, workers consider pension benefit streams as well as 
potential earnings from delayed retirement in their participation decision. There are various 
possibilities to combine these financial elements. 
The basic magnitude for calculating the incentive measures is social security wealth 
(SSW). SSW is the present discounted value of the sum of expected future pension benefits. 
One would expect that persons with a higher level of social security wealth can consume 
more of all goods including retirement leisure. Therefore, the probability of retirement 
should increase in the level of SSW. It would also be natural to expect that a pension system 
provides a higher or at least non-decreasing level of SSW the longer retirement is postponed. 
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If SSW though decreases in the age of retirement, a pension system is actuarially not fair, 
since it financially punishes to stay longer in the labor force. 
We are calculating social security wealth according to the following formula which is 
equivalent to the definition of gross social security wealth on page 911 in Feldstein (1974): 
 
1
( ) ( ) ( | )
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SSW R B R p s t δ −
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= ∑                                                                         (22) 
 
( )tW R  = present discounted value in year t of all future net pension benefits from 
retiring at
SS
 age R. 
+ . ( )sB R  = net pension benefit in year s from retiring at age R, where ≥ 1s R
( | )p s t  = conditional probability of survival until year s given survival until year t. 
δ = 1
1 r+ discount factor.  
r = nominal interest rate.  
T = age of certain death. 
 
Since future pension benefits ( )s R  are unknown, we have to adapt an indexation 
rule that represents the current practice. The policy is that nominal wages and nominal 
pensions should increase at the same rate as described on page 301 in Hofer and Koman
(2006). Therefore, we assume a pension growth in line with the long term projected rate o
wage growth of 1.6 percent per year. The pension benefit of each single year is corrected
a conditional survival probabilit )t . To this end, we are using life tables provided from
Databank (2007b). Maximum age T provided in these life tables is 95. In order to discount 
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future pension benefits to current year t, we are using a 4.6 percent nominal interest rate r. It 
is the sum of a 3 percent real interest rate and a 1.6 percent long term projected inflation 
rate. This implies a nominal discount factor of 1/(1.046)δ = . 
The structure of SSW in Austria is not set in a way to provide incentives for delaying 
retirement until the statutory retirement ages. How does SSW actually behave at different 
retirement ages in Austria, and which changes did reform 2000 bring? For males, we see in 
figure 1 and in table 6 that SSW increases in the age of retirement until it reaches a spike. 
SSW in the base case spikes for retirement at age 60. Reform 2000 even shifted the spike 
back from age 62 to age 60. The immediate incentive prediction is to delay retirement until 
the age at which SSW spikes. For the early retirement ages from age 60 to 64, SSW even 
strictly decreases. Reform 2000 inverted the previously correct incentive structure from age 
60 to 64. So, the incentive to wait until the local age-65 spike age is reached, weakens. After 
the spike age, there is no more incentive to delay retirement, since SSW decreases with every 
year of postponement. Therefore, this incentive structure of SSW suggests retiring before 
the statutory age for men of 65. Furthermore, the levels of SSW at each age of retirement 
decreased after reform 2000, inducing another weakening of the SSW incentive. 
For females, we see in figure 1 and in table 6 that SSW increases in the age of 
retirement until it reaches a spike at age 63 in the base case. Reform 2000 shifted the spike 
from age 62 to age 63. However, looking at the ages of early retirement, age 55 to 59, shows 
a local spike at age 56. Reform 2000 even shifted this local spike backwards. Therefore, this 
incentive structure of SSW suggests retiring before the statutory age for women of 60. 
Furthermore, the levels of SSW at each age of retirement decreased for most ages after 
reform 2000. 
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Figure 1. Age profile of SSW, by sex, base case. 
 
 
Table 6. Age profile of SSW, birth cohorts 1938-1945 
Males Females Retireme
nt 
 age Base case 
Pre reform 
2000 
Post reform 
2000 Base case 
Pre reform 
2000 
Post reform 
2000 
53 255,425 255,425  234,909 234,909  
54 270,665 270,665  232,398 232,398  
55 275,810 275,810  238,683 238,683  
56 277,419 279,400 256,576 243,624 244,933 235,796 
57 275,453 276,840 270,063 242,416 248,397 228,230 
58 281,327 283,752 275,425 240,142 248,697 227,594 
59 283,301 284,776 280,652 238,531 246,876 229,828 
60 *295,759 296,029 *295,425 242,726 242,282 243,090 
61 285,613 306,399 275,278 260,750 255,465 264,315 
62 281,134   *314,334 270,180 271,347 *276,285 269,720 
63 260,236  260,236 *302,902  *302,902 
64 253,110  253,110 293,048  293,048 
65 274,149  274,149 287,084  287,084 
 
Notes: (a) Numbers are age profiles of the incentive measure showing means in 1996 Euros. The table compares the means 
of the incentive measure in the base case, pre and post reform 2000. This also applies to figure 1, except for figure 1. 
only showing the base case. 
 
(b) * indicates spikes of the incentive measure. 
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Acrual 
 
The first incentive variable is the accrual in social security wealth. This is the 
difference in SSW if a worker delays retirement by one year. The ACC gives an incentive to 
stay in the labor force if it is positive or at least non-negative. By postponing retirement by 
one year, a worker will be rewarded if he received a higher level of SSW compared to retiring 
now. If the accrual is negative, there is no incentive to postpone retirement for another year, 
because this would penalize a worker by providing a lower level of SSW compared to 
retiring now. 
The accrual is calculated according to 
 
1( 1) ( )t tACC R SSW R+ + −                                ( 1)t R SSW+ =                           (23) 
)
 
ACC in year t is therefore the difference in SSW between retiring at age R+1 in year 
t+1 and retiring at age R in year t. The formula requires that has to be 
discounted by an additional 
1( 1tSSW R+ +
δ  to the present year t in order to compare the two SSW 
streams at the same discounting level. 
The Austrian pension system has in principle an actuarially unfair accrual age profile 
For the base case, before, and after reform 2000 the ACC at different ages is pictured in 
figure 2 and in table 7. For males, the accrual spikes in the base case at age 64. Before reform 
2000, the spike happens to be at age 59, which increases to age 64 after the reform. For 
females, the accrual spikes at age 62 in the base case. Before reform 2000, the spike was at 
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age 56, which changed to age 62 following the reform. The spike would imply the general 
ACC incentive to retire at age 64 for men, and 62 for women. However, once becoming 
eligible for early retirement, the ACC decreases with every year of postponement until age 63 
for men and age 58 for women. Therefore, for both genders, reform 2000 succeeded in 
shifting the ACC-spike incentive to a later age, but did not take the early retirement years 
into account. Also, the accrual is positive at almost all ages of retirement, the magnitudes 
though are often very small. This raises the question if a slightly positive accrual can really 
induce an incentive to stay in the labor force for another year. Moreover, after reform 2000, 
the level of the accrual decreased at all ages for men, weakening the incentive effect 
originally intended even more. However, the magnitudes of the accrual incentives are very 
small especially before the early retirement ages where an individual is only eligible for 
disability pensions. 
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Figure 2. Age profile of ACC, by sex, base case. 
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Table 7. Age profile of ACC, birth cohorts 1938-1945 
Males Females 
Retireme
n
B
P
2
P
r
2000 Base 
P
2
P
r
2
t 
 age ase case 
re reform 
000 
ost  
eform 
case 
re reform 
000 
ost  
eform 
000 
53 1 1 1 1,463 ,893 ,893 ,463
54 3 3 1 11,860 
3 3 1 14,659 
2 2 - 1 * -
3 4 - 9 1 -
1 2 - 6 11,512 1
1 * 2 1 9 1
9 1 5 6 5 6
5 1 2 4 3 5
1 - 2 * - *
1 1 -  -
* * -  -
1 1 6  6
,986 ,986 1,860
55 ,619 ,619 4,659
56 ,063 ,368 1,143 3,234 15,656 1,253
57 ,456 ,966 2,413 ,051 3,316 1,067
58 ,992 ,869 144 ,914 71
59 4,682 21,743 ,006 3,517 ,210 8,009
60 ,034 2,009 ,349 ,085 ,934 ,208
61 ,484 2,108 ,189 ,596 ,550 ,302
62 ,234 1,480 ,130 20,198 3,840 28,119
63 ,419 ,419 7,061 7,061
64 35,157 35,157 1,600 1,600
65 7,797 7,797 ,667 ,667
 
Notes: see notes to table 6. 
 
 
Peak Value 
 
An individual might not just look ahead one year, but have a longer horizon for 
making his retirement decision. Looking ahead one year might also ignore a situation in 
which the ACC is negative in the next year, but positive in another year. Then, the 
individual might retire at the age that yields the maximum in SSW. Therefore, another 
incentive measure, the peak value (PV), is the difference between the maximum of SSW 
and SSW from retiring now. However, there might be pension systems in which SSW 
decreases for every year of retirement, or in other words the ACC is negative for all 
possible years of retirement. Then, the PV collapses into a negative single year accrual, and 
there is no incentive to delay retirement.  
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So, the PV measure is calculated as 
 
[ ]( ) maxtV s R S> =                               (24) ( ) ( )s t tP SW s R SSW R> > − ,                    
 
which is the gain in SSW in year t from postponing retirement until year , 
where year s yields the maximum possible level of SSW. The peak value is right-censored, 
i.e., the last year to consider the maximum in SSW is 2004. However, there should not be a 
lot of right-censoring since comparing the age profiles of PV and a three-year accrual 
yields almost identical results. 
s t>
The PV incentive in the Austrian pension system (figure 3. and table 8) is not set in 
a way to postpone retirement, either. The spikes for the PV incentive are in the base case 
64 for men and 54 for women. Reform 2000 shifted the spikes from 59 to 64 for men, and 
from 54 to 62 for women. During the early retirement ages, PV is often negative for men 
and decreasing in retirement age for women. This implies the incentive to retire before the 
statutory retirement ages. Reform 2000 improved this structure for women by inverting 
the decrease of PV in early retirement age. For men, PV was inverted, but is negative until 
age 62. The level of PV for men decreased at all ages after reform 2000, weakening the 
incentive to stay in the labor force. For females, reform 2000 increased the levels of PV at 
most ages, strengthening the incentive. 
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Ta ile of birth c s 1938
Retireme
e Base
Pre re
2000 
Po
refo
20 Base
Pre re
2000 
P
ref
20
nt  
ag  case 
form 
st  
rm 
0 0  case 
form 
ost  
orm 
00 
53 -7,210 -7,210  7,473  7,473
54 -6,392 -6,392  *1 *14,725  
 13,876 13,876  
-11,967 9,421 12,901 -11,394
57 -1,936 925 -13,055 6,122 8,665 90
58 2,571 7,984 -10,601 6,555 4,811 9,112
59 6,388 *14,891 -8,875 5,912 632 11,417
60 -815 3,142 -5,714 505 -3,351 3,665
61 -6,073 -671 -8,759 2,331 -7,242 8,788
62 -4,698 -14,127 -1,587 8,869 -15,071 *16,758
63 12,249  12,249 -19,559  -19,559
64 *28,125  *28,125 -13,772  -13,772
65 5,741  5,741 -5,958  -5,958
4,725
55 -6,650 -6,650
56 -5,999 -5,432
 
Notes: see notes to table 6. 
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Option Value 
 
Individuals might not only consider SSW in their retirement decision, but also 
potential earnings from continued work. The option value Boersch-Suppan et al.) combines 
both income sources. It is the sum of the accrual and potential earnings from postponing 
retirement by one year. If the OV is positive, a worker has an incentive to delay retirement. 
A negative accrual might be offset by the amount of potential earnings, so that the OV 
becomes positive. A positive accrual might furthermore result in a very large OV, which 
even strengthens the incentive effect of staying in the labor force. If the OV is negative, 
however, potential earnings are not high enough to offset a loss in SSW. Then, there is no 
incentive to delay retirement.  
In formulae, the OV of postponing retirement to age R+1 is defined as  
 
1( 1) ( 1t tOV R NETEARN ACC R++ = + + )t
g the 
ment. 
,                                                    (25) 
 
where 1tETEARN +  is the present discounted value of potential net earnings durin
year of postponing retire
N
The age profile of the OV (figure 4 and table 9) does not provide incentives to delay 
retirement. The spike ages of the OV are in the base case 64 for men and 62 for women. 
Reform 2000 shifted these spikes from 59 to 64 for men, and from 56 to 62 for females. 
During the early retirement years, the OV decreases in age. Reform 2000 did not change this 
basic structure for men. However, it slightly improved for women. The OV levels decreased 
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for both genders at most ages following reform 2000. Therefore, the incentive to postpone 
retirement weakened. 
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Figure 4. Age profile of OV, by sex, base case. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Age profile of OV, birth cohorts 1938-1945 
Males Females 
Retireme
n
B
P
2
P
r
2000 Base 
P
2
P
r
2
t  
age ase case 
re reform 
000 
ost  
eform 
case 
re reform 
000 
ost  
eform 
000 
53 1 1  1 1  6,472 6,472 3,513 3,513 
54 1 1  2 2  
1 1  2 2  
1 1 1 2 * 1
2 2 1 1 2 9
1 2 1 1 2 1
3 * 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 * 4 *
1  1 1  1
*  * 6  6
3  3 1  1
9,855 9,855 3,432 3,432 
55 9,873 9,873 6,455 6,455 
56 8,795 9,459 1,807 4,667 27,064 0,336
57 0,445 2,370 2,965 9,848 4,083 ,804
58 9,284 0,339 6,719 7,259 1,855 0,518
59 1,946 38,807 9,630 3,605 9,587 7,794
60 6,561 9,457 2,976 5,972 5,973 5,970
61 2,706 9,905 9,127 4,926 3,115 6,147
62 8,996 5,270 0,225 29,671 ,659 37,912
63 8,318 8,318 ,574 ,574
64 51,624 51,624 ,461 ,461
65 3,572 3,572 6,323 6,323
 
Notes: see notes to table 6 
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Implicit Tax on Work 
 
Another way to look at the interaction of SSW and potential earnings is called social 
security tax on work or penalty on work (IST). This is the negative ratio of the accrual and 
potential net earnings from work during the year of postponing retirement. A positive 
accrual will result in a subsidy rate, the IST being negative. This represents an incentive to 
stay in the labor force. Delaying retirement is rewarded by a gain in SSW. The more negative 
the subsidy ratio, the bigger this incentive effect is.  If the accrual is smaller than potential 
earnings, then the IST is negative but greater than (-1). In this case, the incentive to work is 
very weak. If the IST is positive, we think of it as a tax on continued work. Having a negative 
accrual makes the IST a tax, and penalizes staying in the labor force. The more positive the 
IST in this case is, the higher the incentive to retire now is, tax rates below 1 provide a very 
weak incentive to retire. 
Therefore the implicit tax on work is calculated as 
 
1
( 1)tACC RIST ( 1)t
t
R
NETEARN +
++ =                    (26) 
 but 
 for 
−                                                       
 
The age profile of IST (figure 5 and table 10) provides for most ages a correct,
weak incentive to postpone retirement. The IST spikes at ages 64 for men and 62 for 
women. Reform 2000 shifted these spikes from 59 to 64 for men, and from 56 to 62
women. At the early retirement ages, the IST is often negative but greater than (-1), 
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providing a very weak incentive to stay in the labor force. Reform 2000 did not improve
this situation for males. It even worsened the IST incentive for females shifting from a 
weak subsidy to a tax on continued work. The levels of the IST increased
 
 by reform 2000 
for both genders, also weakening the incentive to postpone retirement. 
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Figure 5. Age profile of IST, by sex, base case. 
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Table 10. Age profile of IST, birth cohorts 1938-1945 
Males Females 
Retireme
n
B
P
2
P
r
2000 Base 
P
2
P
r
2
t 
age ase case 
re reform 
000 
ost  
eform 
case 
re reform 
000 
ost  
eform 
000 
53 -0.074 -0.074  -0.075 -0.075  
54 -0.278 -0.278  -0.906 -0.906  
-0.219 -0.219  -1.120 -1.120  
-0.104 -0.129 0.161 -0.975 *-1.156 0.104 
-0.185 -0.278 0.176 -0.695 -1.067 0.186 
-0.120 -0.171 0.005 -0.487 -0.912 0.138 
-0.813 *-1.208 -0.106 -0.890 -0.661 -1.129 
-0.476 -0.667 -0.240 -0.383 -0.429 -0.345 
-0.305 -0.670 -0.123 -0.271 -0.224 -0.303 
-0.041 0.071 -0.078 *-1.686 0.623 *-2.446 
0  0.040 1.179  1
*  *-1.802 0.838  0
-  -0.953 -0.491  -
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 .040 .179 
64 -1.802 .838 
65 0.953 0.491 
 
Notes: see notes to table 6. 
 
 
Regression Approach 
 
Empirically, we are looking at the effect of the incentive variables on the 
probability of retirement. The main empirical hypothesis to be tested is that retirement 
behavior in Austria responds to the financial incentives embedded in the pension system. 
In particular, one would expect an increase in the level of SSW to have a positive impact 
on the probability of retirement. Also, we expect an increase in one of the accrual 
measures, i.e., the one year accrual, the peak value, and the option value to have a negative 
impact on the probability of retirement. Finally, an increase of the implicit tax on work 
should have a positive effect on the probability of retirement. 
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The incentive effects on the probability of retirement are twofold. First, there is a 
wealth effect, represented by a variation in the level of SSW. A higher SSW would induce the 
consumption of more goods, including retirement leisure. This effect is similar to an income 
effect in the basic labor-leisure choice model. The second effect is the accrual effect. Increasing 
consumption in the retirement period resulting from an additional year of work is compared 
to an additional year of leisure. The accrual effect is the equivalent of the substitution effect 
in the basic labor-leisure choice. It represents the effect of the change in the relative price of 
retirement leisure over time on the decision to retire. The accrual effect can be represented 
by any of the above accrual measures, the one year accrual ACC, the PV accrual, the OV or 
the IST. 
We are estimating a linear probability model with fixed effects in which the 
dependent variable R is a binary indicator of retiring at age t conditional on being in the 
labor force in year t-1. Retirement is an absorbing state, so for each individual, only the first 
year of retirement is used. The regression equation for the i-th individual observed in year t is 
specified as 
 
 it
ENT0 1 2
3 4 5 6 .
it it
it it it it i it
R SSW INC
INCOME AGE X Y a u
β β β
β β β β
= + +
+ + + + + +  
 
d 
 is a set of age dummies. 
+
                                      (27)
SSW  is social security wealth, INCENT  is one of the above incentive measures, 
either the accrual, or peak value, or the option value, or the implicit tax on work. INCOME
is a set of income controls, including potential earnings next year as well as pensionable 
earnings and squares. The reason for using income controls is that higher income shoul
increase the probability of retirement. Individuals then can buy more goods including 
 
retirement leisure. AGE X  is a matrix of individual characteristics 
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affecting the retirement decision, including health, industry affiliation, occupation, and 
location. Due to the fixed effects estimation, a dummy for academic degree is not included
However, the individual fixed effects controls for this. Y  is a set of year dummies, and ia is
an individual fixed effect. For further explanation of the variables used in the regress
refer to append
. 
 
ion
ix A.2. 
s 
As an important point for capturing the effects of reforms, the panel variables are 
constructed in the following way. Individuals are completely surprised by pension reform. 
Therefore, they adapt their expectations about present and future incentive measures 
according to the current year legislation. Once a reform is implemented, individuals change 
their expectations following the reform, and changing their expectations for all current and 
future years according to the reform legislation. This approach enables me to simulate the 
effect of retirement incentives on the probability of retirement before and after the reform. 
 
  
  
CHAPTER 6 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
 A first round of results contains the regression results of financial incentives, a set of 
controls on the probability of retirement as well as the goodness of fit of theses models. The 
coefficient estimates of the financial incentive variables show striking differences in 
international comparison. Austrians respond much stronger to a change in financial 
incentives than older workers in other countries. Also, unlike in most other countries, 
women respond stronger to accrual incentives than men. 
 
Retirement Incentives 
 
First, we will report regression results for males and females in table 11. For 
complete regression output, please refer to appendix A.3. There are four different models 
for males and females each. For each regression model, coefficient estimates of the linear 
probability model are reported. In the regression, SSW, ACC, PV, OV and the income 
controls are expressed in units of 10,000 Euros. The interpretation of a coefficient estimate 
in a linear probability model is straight forward. The coefficient represents ceteris paribus the 
percentage point change in the probability of retirement following a unit increase in the 
explanatory variable. The estimates on the financial incentives get the expected signs and are 
significant all across the models. There are three exceptions. The coefficient on SSW in the 
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PV model for females is insignificant. The coefficient on the IST for men gets the wrong 
sign, for females it gets the right sign but is insignificant. 
 
 
Table 11. Linear probability model (fixed effects), 
 Retirement probability (dependent variable) 
Variable  
Males 
 ACC model PV model OV model IST model 
SSW 0.096 0.094 0.096 0.099 
t-value   (57.18)** (54.58)** (57.18)** (59.38)** 
     
ACC -0.011    
t-value   (9.39)**    
     
PV  -0.013   
t-value    (10.65)**   
     
OV   -0.011  
t-value     (9.39)**  
     
IST    -0.011 
t-value      (6.73)** 
     
Number of obs. 75,494 75,494 75,494 75,494 
     
Females 
 ACC model PV model OV model IST model 
SSW 0.009 0 0.009 0.013 
t-value   (3.91)** (0.08) (3.91)** (6.08)** 
     
ACC -0.021    
t-value   (10.86)**    
     
PV  -0.023   
t-value    (11.84)**   
     
OV   -0.021  
t-value     (10.86)**  
     
IST     0 
t-value      (0.08) 
     
Number of obs. 47,153 47,153 47,153 47,153 
 
Notes: (a) Model estimated as a linear probability model with fixed effects. SSW, ACC, PV, and OV are in  
10,000 Euros. Only incentive measures are reported. For complete regression results, see tables A.3.1 through A.3.4. 
 
(b) * Significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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All across the four models, coefficients of SSW are highly significant for men and get 
the expected positive sign. For males, the effect of a 10,000 Euro increase in the level of 
SSW increases the probability to retire between 9.4 and 9.9 percentage points. For females, 
all estimates for SSW are significant and get the expected positive sign as well. Therefore, a 
10,000 Euro increase in the level of SSW increases the probability of retirement by 0.9 to 1.3 
percentage points. The magnitude of the coefficient on SSW is smaller for women than for 
men. 
In the ACC model, we see that for males, the coefficient on the ACC is significant 
and gets the expected negative sign. The same holds for females. A 10,000 Euro increase in 
the ACC decreases the probability of retirement by 1.1 percentage points in the male case, 
and by 2.1 percentage points in the female case. This is relatively surprising, since the 
financial incentives should work better with men rather than with women. As found in 
Gruber and Wise (2004), men should respond stronger to financial incentives than women. 
The reason for that is the higher share of household income originating from men rather 
than from women. However, there is a special situation in Austria concerning legal 
retirement ages. Women in Austria have earlier retirement ages, and couples are to a certain 
degree making joint retirement decisions. Therefore, the joint retirement decision seems to 
be women driven rather than men driven, which would point at a better hold of financial 
incentives with women compared to men. Zweimuller, Winter-Ebmer, and Falkinger (1996) 
support this hypothesis. They present evidence that the cross-effect on men’s participation 
rates, resulting from a rise in the women’s early retirement age, is almost one half of the 
direct effect on the women’s participation rates. There is no similar effect vice versa. 
Another country that has different legal retirement ages for men and women is Italy. 
Brugiavini and Peracchi (2004) found that like in Austria, men respond stronger to changes 
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in SSW, while women respond stronger to changes in the accrual incentives. So, there seems 
to be a correlation between different retirement ages for men and women and a gender 
difference in the response to financial incentives. 
In the peak value model, the estimated coefficients on the PV are significant and get 
the expected negative sign for both sexes. Any 10,000 Euro increase in the PV results in a 
decrease in the probability of retirement of 1.3 percentage points for males, and 2.3 
percentage points for females, respectively. Again, women respond stronger to the peak 
value incentive than men.                                                                                                                                
In the option value model, coefficients on the OV are both significant and get the 
expected negative sign for both sexes. For females, any 10,000 Euro increase in the OV 
results in a decrease of the probability of retirement by 1.1 percentage points. For females, 
this magnitude is 2.1 percentage points. Remarkably, the estimated models for the ACC and 
the OV give almost identical results, both for men and women. The OV is the sum of ACC 
and prospective earnings from postponing retirement. Therefore, the identical estimates for 
ACC and OV might indicate that the retirement decision looking ahead one year is only 
determined by the accrual in social security wealth alone, but not by prospective earnings in 
the year of postponement. 
In the IST model, the coefficient on the implicit tax on work is significant, but gets 
the wrong negative sign for males. For females, it is insignificant, but gets the right sign. 
However, the magnitude of this coefficient for females is very close to 0. This suggests that 
individuals in Austria do not respond to the IST. However, this does not contradict the 
estimates for the other incentive variables. The IST is inconsistent with the other incentive 
measures in the way that it is a rate rather than a marginal benefit measure. 
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Overall, individuals in Austria respond to the financial incentive to retire. The 
strongest response comes from the PV incentive for both sexes. The ACC shows a lower 
degree of responsiveness. This finding is in line with most country studies in Gruber and 
Wise (2004). People respond stronger to several-year accruals than to one-year accruals.  
This suggests that people not only look ahead one year, but more importantly have a longer 
horizon in making their retirement decision. Accrual effects are usually stronger than wealth 
effects for females. For males, wealth effects are stronger than accrual effects which points 
in the direction of men being on their backwards bending portion of the inter temporal labor 
supply function. Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in the relative price of retirement 
leisure on the probability of retirement is negative for women and positive for men.  
Also, the effects of a change in the incentive measures on the retirement probability 
are relatively high in international comparison. We are relating the incentive effects in 
Austria to the findings in Gruber and Wise (2004). This shows that an increase in SSW on 
the probability of retirement in Austria is 107 times higher than in the US, 96 times higher 
than in France, and 48 times higher than in Sweden. An increase in the ACC in Austria 
changes the probability of retirement by percentage points 2.75 times higher than in the US, 
10 times higher than in France, 2.75 times higher than in Sweden, and 1.5 times higher than 
in Germany. Similar patterns apply to the other incentive measures. An explanation for this 
high responsiveness of Austrians is certainly linked to the number of pension pillars. 
Austrians only rely on the one public pension system. Their whole retirement income comes 
out of this unique source. The United States, on contrary, have a long tradition of 3 or even 
more pension pillars, so Americans will not respond that strongly to changes in public social 
security. France has a state plan and a complementary occupational scheme. Swedish rely on 
a public plan, a private defined benefit plan, and a private defined contribution plan. Only 
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Germans also heavily rely on the public pillar. Their responsiveness comes therefore very 
close to that of Austrians. 
 
 
Other Control Variables 
 
The impact of the control variables on the probability of retirement can be 
summarized as follows. The income controls show that for both sexes, the probability of 
retirement increases in expected earnings next year. This supports retirement leisure to be a 
normal good. Increasing pensionable income (squared) also increases the probability of 
retirement, except for males (coefficient on the PE variable). Since social security wealth is a 
function of pensionable income, this finding is consistent with the above findings about the 
sign of SSW.  
Age plays a crucial role, having the highest impact on the probability of retirement at 
ages 61 (65) for males, and 60 for females, pointing at a barely different retirement age for 
both sexes despite the legal five year differences. These age effects are highly significant, 
large in magnitude, and consistent all across the different models.  
Also, health is a very important control variable. The effect of a percentage increase 
in the share of sick days relative to labor force participation is strong. For males, it increases 
the probability of retirement by roughly 44 percentage points. For females, it decreases the 
retirement probability by 7 percentage points which is counterintuitive. This result suggests 
that for males, health condition is playing a more prominent role in the decision to retire 
than for women. The largely higher share of disability pensions for males confirms this 
result.  
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Controlling for the sector of employment shows that workers in the production 
sector have a lower probability to retire relative to workers in the service sector. This is 
counterintuitive. We would expect a positive effect of more health deteriorating jobs in 
production on the retirement probability. For occupation, the results are as expected. Being 
a blue collar worker rather than a white collar employee increases the probability of 
retirement because of more health deteriorating jobs. 
Location dummies show that working in Vienna or Western Austria increases the 
probability of retirement. In these two regions, earnings are traditionally higher than in the 
economically disadvantaged regions of Eastern and Southern Austria. 
Year dummies indicate that the “social norms” change into the direction of a higher 
probability to retire in later years of the panel. This might suggest an impact of the 
continuing reform process on retirement behavior. Individuals expect pension reforms to 
make retirement regulations more disadvantageous. Therefore, they retire before another 
reform is implemented. It might, however, also reflect the age structure of the panel, where 
later years represent older age groups than earlier years in the panel.  
Overall, the control variables largely get the expected signs and are mostly significant. 
They show that age and health play a crucial role in the retirement decision in line with 
financial incentives. 
 
Goodness of Fit 
 
We are assessing the goodness of fit by looking at the share of correct retirement 
choice predictions across the models. The higher proportion of correct prediction for men 
supports the differences in the within R squared for men and women. The within R squared 
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for men is 51 percent (table A3.1) compared to a within R squared for women of 48 percent 
(table A3.2). Table 12 compares observed and predicted choices to retire or not to retire. 
Overall, the predictive power of all models is relatively high. For males, the proportion of 
correctly predicted retirement choices ranges from 44.9 to 45.5 percent. Females show a 
smaller degree of correctly predicted outcomes, ranging from 40.5 to 40.8 percent for the 
choice to retire. Again, the ACC model and the OV model yield identical results. For males, 
the PV model has the highest predictive power, while for females it is the IST model. Both 
sexes show a higher proportion of successes in the PV model. This implies that the PV 
model captures the retirement decision slightly better than the ACC or the OV models. 
Therefore, the regression results that people respond stronger to the PV than to the ACC or 
the OV are confirmed by the assessment of goodness of fit.  
 
 
Table 12. Correctly predicted retirement choices 
(frequencies and proportions) 
  Predicted 
  Males Females 
Model Observed 0 1 % correct 0 1 % correct 
0 47,658 9,449 0.835 27,025 7,322 0.787 ACC 1 10,071 8,316 0.452 7,619 5,187 0.405 
0 47,507 9,600 0.832 27,571 6,776 0.803 PV 1 10,019 8,368 0.455 7,584 5,222 0.408 
0 47,658 9,449 0.835 27,025 7,322 0.787 OV 1 10,071 8,316 0.452 7,619 5,187 0.405 
0 47,697 9,410 0.835 26,911 7,436 0.784 IST 1 10,132 8,255 0.449 7,526 5,280 0.412 
 
Notes: Table compares observed and predicted retirement choices, b  model and sex. Success (1) is defined as a y
predicted probability greater or equal to 1. 1=retire, 0=do not retire. 
  
  
CHAPTER 7 
POLICY SIMULATIONS 
 
The estimates in the last chapter are used to simulate some policy scenarios. The 
basic idea behind the simulations is the following. A pension reform scenario changes 
pension benefits, and hence the financial incentives. For mean representative agents of each 
age group, we evaluate how these reforms alter the predicted probabilities of retirement as 
the incentives change, holding everything else constant. Then, we use the simulations to 
predict the public savings in pension expenditures from any of the reform scenarios. 
 The retirement probabilities are therefore calculated by predicting the probability of 
retirement for each observation, then averaging these probabilities by age. Since the linear 
probability model can return predicted probabilities outside the [0,1]-interval, it is assumed 
that every prediction smaller than 0 has a predicted probability of 0. Likewise, every 
prediction greater than 1 is assumed to be a predicted probability of 1. 
 First, we are going to describe the reform scenarios. Then, we will present the 
impact of each scenario on the age profile of predicted retirement probabilities compared to 
the base case (i.e., the data used in the regressions). Finally, we are calculating the public 
savings implied by each scenario. 
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Simulation Approach 
 
We are using the estimates from the last chapter in order to simulate the impact of 
past and future reform scenarios on the predicted probability of retirement at the 
appropriate ages. To this end, we are evaluating the change of the predicted probabilities of 
retirement at the means of the age profile. As the base case, we are using the incentive 
calculations applied in the estimation. For the reference cases, we are recalculating pension 
benefits and retirement incentives according to the rules in S1 and S2 below. Then, we are 
comparing the changes in predicted probabilities at the new incentive means by age to the 
base case. 
Therefore, the predicted retirement probability lR  for a representative agent of age a 
is 
 
 l 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )n nR a x SSW a x INCENT a x Control aβ β β= + +∑ , (28) 
 
where scenario x is either the base case, pre reform 2000, post reform 2000, S1 or 
S2. An overbar indicates the mean of a variable at a certain age a as calculated for each 
scenario. Basically, each scenario changes the incentive variables SSW and INCENT.  So, for 
a mean representative agent, we are using the incentive variables at their means for each age 
(see table A4.1). The betas are the estimated coefficients from table A3.1. for men and A.3.2. 
for women. The controls from the regression are held constant across the simulated 
scenarios. They are also at their means for each age. 
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The simulations are done separate by incentive model and sex. Looking in the past, 
this study is trying to simulate the impact of reform 2000 on the probability of retirement. It 
basically compares the probability effects of legislation 1997 and legislation 2000 at the mean 
incentives of the age profile. Early retirement age was raised from 60 to 61.5 for men and 
from 55 to 56.5 for women, respectively. The penalty for retiring before the statutory 
retirement age was raised from 2 to 3 percentage points deduction per year in the 
replacement rate. Early retirement due to reduced working capacity was abolished. 
Looking in the future, the first simulation scenario (S1) is a hypothetical reform that 
delays all eligibility ages for early and normal retirement by three years. This implies statutory 
retirement ages to increase from 65 to 68 for men, and from 60 to 63 for women, 
respectively. All other factors of pension benefit computation remain unchanged. All ages 
before early retirement follow the rules for disability pensions. The basic idea simulating this 
reform scenario is a three year shift in the distribution of predicted retirement probabilities. 
Therefore, we are using for instance a representative agent of age 54 along with the 
recalculated incentive measures for age 57. This gives the predicted retirement probability 
for age 57. 
The second hypothetical reform scenario (S2) can be called “common reform”. 
Gruber and Wise (2004) performed this scenario for each of the country studies. Therefore, 
S2 is the most direct way to compare the incentive effects in Austria to other OECD 
countries, even though it is a highly unrealistic scenario. In this hypothetical reform, early 
retirement age is 60 for men, 55 for women. The statutory ages are 65 and 60, respectively. 
Disability pensions before the early retirement ages are abolished. The replacement rate is 
fixed at 60 percent of age 65/60 earnings. For each year of early retirement, the pension 
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benefit decreases by 6 percent. Likewise, the same principle applies to reward delayed 
retirement after ages 65/60. Minimum and maximum pension rules will be preserved. 
 
Simulation Results 
 
The simulations suggest that reforming a pension system is a very tough undertaking. 
On the one hand, legislation not only has to consider the age profile of social security 
wealth, but also the age profile of accruals in social security wealth. This implies that policy 
makers have to know the directions and relative magnitudes of wealth and accrual effects. 
Not knowing them might lead to adverse effects of pension reform. The simulation results 
in figures A.4.1 through A.4.4 (appendix A.4) show very similar predictions of the age 
profiles across all models. The calculated changes in the age profiles of incentive measures 
are in table A4.1. Table A4.2 reports the predicted probabilities of the appropriate model by 
age and sex.  Males usually have spikes in predicted retirement probabilities at ages 57, 61, 
and 65 in the base case. Women have those spikes at ages 56 and 60. The predicted 
probability of retirement sharply inclines once the early retirement option becomes available. 
However, especially men have higher retirement probabilities than women at ages where 
only a disability pension is available. Most studies in Gruber and Wise (2004) show no or 
only one pronounced spike at early retirement ages. However, Brugiavini and Peracchi 
(2004) find in the Italian case multiple spikes similar to Austria.  
Experimenting with retirement probabilities by firms in the production and the 
service sector shows no differences compared to the mean representative agent in the spikes. 
However, the overall predicted retirement probability in the production sector is 15.4/18.6 
percentage points (males/females) lower than in the service sector. This roughly confirms 
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the (counterintuitive) parameter estimates. Also, retirement probabilities across regions 
confirm the estimates. People working in Vienna have by far the highest retirement 
probabilities. The other Austrian regions are roughly 20 percentage points below Vienna. 
Reform 2000 failed in strengthening the incentives to delay retirement. On contrary, 
it accomplished an adverse effect increasing all retirement probabilities for both sexes. This 
failure is partly due to looking too much at the effect of retirement wealth SSW, but 
overseeing a weakening of the accrual effects for postponing retirement. If for instance the 
one year accrual for men at age 60 decreases from Euros 12,009 pre reform to Euros 5,349 
post reform, then there is no reason to believe that retirement will be postponed to age 61 to 
a greater extent. 
Reform 2000 decreased SSW for all retirement ages of men. Therefore, we would 
expect a negative probability effect for the male wealth effect. For most ages, the accrual 
measures across all models decreased. This would imply a positive probability effect for the 
male accrual effects. The probability of retirement combining both, wealth- and accrual 
effects, increases for almost all ages compared to the pre reform 2000 case. This represents a 
situation in which the positive accrual effect dominates the negative wealth effect and makes 
the overall effect positive. Therefore, reform 2000 failed in providing stronger incentives for 
delayed retirement for men, mainly because of the accruals being decreased.  
Also for women, reform 2000 failed the intent to provide incentives for postponing 
retirement. SSW decreased for all ages, which causes the probability of retirement to 
decrease. The accrual measures decline for most ages, so that we would expect the 
retirement probability to increase. Overall, the wealth effect is much smaller than the accrual 
effect. Therefore, the probability of retirement increased at all ages for females. Again, the 
accrual incentive effects were weakened by reform 2000. 
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Simulation S1, a three year delay in eligibility ages for early and statutory retirement 
would have strong effects on the retirement probabilities. It shifts the probability 
distribution to later ages, but is only effective in postponing retirement at certain ages. 
Fore males, SSW has no unique direction at all ages. This implies a negative or 
positive wealth effect. Also, the accrual effect has not unique direction at most ages, 
inducing positive or negative accrual effects. Between ages 60 to 63 and at age 65, the 
probability of retirement decreases compared to the base case. In this case, SSW goes up or 
down and ACC goes up. The bigger negative accrual effect outweighs the wealth effect, 
resulting in a declining probability of retirement. Also, S1 is successful in shifting the peak of 
the probability of retirement to a later age. 
For females, SSW declines at ages 56, 57, and 60, and hence decreases the probability 
of retirement. The accrual incentives at these ages in contrast incline, implying a decrease in 
the retirement probabilities. Combined wealth- and accrual effects working in the same 
direction cause the probability of retirement to decrease. At all other ages, S1 fails in 
decreasing the retirement probabilities. 
Simulation S2, the common reform, is successful in decreasing the retirement 
probabilities. It reduces the level of SSW by a huge amount compared to all other scenarios. 
The ACC has no unique direction. Therefore, the huge negative wealth effect outweighs a 
smaller accrual effect. Hence, the probability of retirement decreases for all ages. Moreover, 
it shows no spikes at early retirement ages for males. 
For women, S2 shows smaller retirement probabilities at all ages as well. SSW 
decreases strongly, the accrual measures also decrease, but not to a big extent. Therefore, the 
huge negative wealth effect outweighs the weaker positive accrual effect. This results in an 
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overall decreasing retirement probability at all ages. The only difference in S2 compared to 
males is a local spike at age 56 for women. 
The simulations show that the features of pension plans can yield very different 
retirement incentives. It is not enough to just look at the age profile of SSW. Also, it is 
necessary to consider the different accrual measures which determine the relative price of 
retirement leisure. In Austria, this is especially true for women. For them, a change in the 
relative price of leisure has a greater effect than a change in retirement wealth. 
 
Public Savings by Reform Scenarios 
 
Finally, we are evaluating the public savings for all of the above reform options. 
Since this study is looking at the scenarios from a micro perspective, we are comparing the 
expenditure savings in SSW for each age group of retirees. Hence, for a representative agent 
retiring at age a, the expenditure savings S in SSW for any scenario are 
 
l l
l
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , ) ( 1)
( , ) ( , )
SSW a base case R a base case SSW a x R a xS a x
SSW a base case R a base case
⋅ − ⋅= − ⋅ . (29) 
by the 
 
 
This is the percentage change in SSW from the base case compared to one of the scenarios 
x. SSW for any scenario is weighted by the predicted retirement probabilities. In case of 
reform 2000, we are comparing the pre and post reform 2000 scenarios. Therefore, the 
simulated changes in public expenditures include two effects for a representative agent 
retiring at age a. The first effect represents the change in SSW expenditures induced 
change of pension benefit calculation rules of a reform scenario. The second effect 
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represents the behavioral change induced by altering the financial incentives in any of the 
reform scenarios. While the first effect is just the difference in SSW from the base case to a 
reference scenario (compare in table A4.1), the second effect captures the difference is 
retirement behavior at any age (comparing the predicted retirement probabilities in table 
4.2). 
s 
. While 
n 
 not contain a disability options, 
these age groups would not require any more expenditures.
A
 The savings of different reform options are partially huge, having the biggest saving
for reform scenario S2 (see table A4.3). The results do not vary a lot across models
reform 2000 brought savings for male retirees starting at age 62, it implied higher 
expenditures for female retirees at all ages. Scenario S1, the 3 year delay in eligibility ages 
would imply saving for men retiring at the ages 60, 61, 62, and 65. For women, age 56, 57, 
and 60 retirees would bring savings in pension expenditures. The most successful scenario i
terms of public savings is the “common reform” S2. Both, male and female retirees would 
induce public savings at all ages of retirement. Since S2 does
  
  
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In Austria, the responsiveness of older workers to retirement incentives is significant 
and high in magnitude. Austrian private sector workers respond stronger to financial 
retirement incentives than workers for instance in the US, Germany, France, and Sweden. 
Both sexes show the strongest response to the peak value incentive. Therefore, Austrians 
have a horizon over several years in their retirement decision. Changing retirement 
incentives can be decomposed into a wealth and an accrual effect. Both effects work in 
opposite directions. An increase in SSW (wealth effect) increases wealth. Therefore, one can 
buy more goods including retirement leisure. An increase in an accrual measure (accrual 
effect) makes retirement now more expensive compared to retiring later.  For men, the 
wealth effect is greater than the accrual effect. For women, in contrast, the accrual effect is 
stronger than the wealth effect. The effect of an increase in social security wealth on the 
probability of retirement is positive and 10 times as strong for men compared to women. 
The effect of an increase in an accrual incentive (one-year accrual, peak value, option value) 
on the retirement probability is negative. Women respond 2 times as strong as men to 
accrual increases. Therefore, women are responding stronger to accrual incentives than men, 
which is surprising compared to most country studies in Gruber and Wise (2004). Though 
not observable, there seems to be a joint retirement decision making among couples driven 
by the woman’s retirement decision. Men who have later legal retirement ages than women 
do not respond to accrual incentives to the extent women do, because they adapt their 
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retirement behavior to the decisions of their spouses. The case of Italy in Brugiavini and 
Peracchi (2004), also featuring different retirement ages for men and women supports this 
conclusion. Important influences on the retirement decision other than financial incentives 
come from age and health. 
Simulations show that the impact of a change in the incentives on the probability of 
retirement is huge at every age. The impact of reform 2000 on retirement behavior was 
adverse to the intended effect. This is mainly due to a decrease in the accruals, decreasing the 
opportunity costs of retiring now. Simulation S1, a 3 year delay in all eligibility ages, is partly 
successful in decreasing the probability of retirement at some ages. Simulation S2, the 
“common reform” is an extreme policy scenario. Therefore, the decline in the probability of 
retirement happens at all ages for men and women. This is mainly due to a huge negative 
wealth effect. 
What are the policy lessons we learn from the retirement behavior of Austrians? The 
2 effects (wealth- and accrual effect) induced by a change in the incentives work into 
opposite directions. It is important to know the extent to which Austrians respond to either 
effect in order to make reform succeed. 
The response to a change in an incentive measure is relatively strong compared to 
other countries. The reason for that might ground on the fact that Austrians, like no other 
OECD country, greatly rely on the one public pension pillar only. As mentioned before, 
there is barley any form of old age income security apart from the universal public pension 
plan. Therefore, small changes in the incentive measures induced by reform should have a 
strong impact on retirement behavior. 
  
 78
The accruals in social security wealth are currently relatively small. So, accounting for 
inflation and the time value of money, the loss from not postponing retirement is relatively 
small, too. Therefore, policy makers should increase the penalty for early retirement. 
A special Austrian issue is the different legal ages at which men and women are 
entitled for any form of retirement (apart from a disability pension). The joint retirement 
decision within couples, however, seems to impose the motivation especially on men to 
make very frequent use of early retirement. Therefore, the actual average retirement ages of 
men and women do not differ a lot. A solution to this problem might be to bring down the 
statutory retirement age for men for two or three years. Then, the financial incentives set in a 
new way might make men retire even later than they currently do. 
Another specifically Austrian problem is the evasion into a disability pension as early 
before early retirement becomes feasible. This points at a practice of disability entitlement 
that is too generous and does not necessarily serve the purpose it is implemented for. Unlike 
in Germany, where the share of disability pensions is also relatively high, the behavior of 
men and women differ. Women do not retire on a disability pension to the extent men do. 
Hence, the different legal retirement ages for men and women seem to have unintended 
consequences. In a joint retirement decision among couples, men seem to evade into a 
disability pension adapting their retirement date to that of their spouses. 
Overall, the Austrian pension system needs further reform. Reforms so far were not 
very effective in implementing retirement incentives to delay retirement. The main directions 
for reform should concern the benefit calculation rules, the differences in legal retirement 
ages for men and women, as well as the handling of disability pensions. An increase in the 
accruals of SSW would strengthen the financial incentives to delay retirement. This implies 
higher deductions for each year of early retirement. Also, early retirement ages should not 
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have spikes in SSW. Bringing together the eligibility ages of men and women for different 
retirement options would eliminate the unintended behavioral consequences under the 
current system. The rules for granting disability pensions have to be tightened. Under the 
current practice, disability pensions are often used as a form of early retirement.
  
  
APPENDIX 1 
INCOME HISTORIES 
 
Predicting the Share of Unemployment 
 
 In order to impute pensionable income (PE) pre 1997, we are using a 
weighted sum of backwards projected earnings (EARN) and the pensionable amount of 
unemployment compensation (PUE), according to: 
 
 
ˆ ˆ
1
365 365
dPE EARN PUE
⎛ ⎞ ⎛= − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
d ⎞⎟⎠
d Age Locatio
, (30) 
 
where  is the predicted number of days being unemployed at a certain age and having 
certain other characteristics. We are estimating  with the OLS regression model (table 
A1.1) 
dˆ
d
 
 3 4n Degree Sex0 1 2 β β ε+ + + , (31) β β β= + +
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Table A1.1. OLS estimates for number of days in unemployment 
Variable Coefficient 
Age37 -0.363 
 (0.79) 
Age38 -1.809 
 (4.16)** 
Age39 -3.452 
 (8.18)** 
Age40 -4.150 
 (10.03)** 
Age41 -3.878 
 (9.50)** 
Age42 -3.602 
 (8.91)** 
Age43 -3.398 
 (8.46)** 
Age44 -3.493 
 (8.67)** 
Age45 -3.632 
 (8.99)** 
Age46 -3.597 
 (8.87)** 
Age47 -3.246 
 (7.98)** 
Age48 -3.253 
 (7.97)** 
Age49 -3.451 
 (8.42)** 
Age50 -3.597 
 (8.75)** 
Age51 -3.372 
 (8.17)** 
Age52 -3.601 
 (8.68)** 
Age53 -2.793 
 (6.70)** 
Age54 -0.116 
 (0.28) 
Age55 0.437 
 (1.03) 
Age56 -0.062 
 (0.14) 
Age57 -5.061 
 (11.37)** 
Age58 -5.027 
 (11.03)** 
Vienna 15.263 
 (133.80)** 
EAustria 14.031 
 (107.64)** 
SAustria 20.127 
 (146.88)** 
Degree -9.146 
 (51.75)** 
Sex 0.177 
 (2.34)* 
Constant 12.913 
 (34.20)** 
Observations 1,651,167 
R-squared  0.03 
 
Notes: (a) Regression for number of unemployment days. Variables used are age dummies,  
location dummies, an academic degree dummy, and a sex dummy.  
 
(b) Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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where Age is a set of age dummies from ages 36 to 58, Location is a set of locational dummies 
distinguishing labor force activity in Vienna, Southern Austria, Eastern Austria, and Western 
Austria. Degree is a dummy for an academic degree, Sex is a dummy for gender. 
Then, this study will calculate a predicted number of unemployment days for every person 
having a combination of the above attributes.  
It should be noticed that the sample used for the above regression is different from the 
sample described in chapter 5. The persons in the latter sample are at least 52 years of age in 
1997. To predict unemployment days for them going back 15 years, there is need for age 
groups younger than 52. 
 
 
Calculation of Net Earnings and Net Pension Benefits 
 
Since the data only gives information on gross earnings, this study has to apply the 
rules of wage taxation to receive net earnings values. In general, net earnings in Austria are 
calculated according to the following schedule: 
 
A. Gross current earnings or gross current pensions 
B. Payroll tax (employees pay pension, health, and unemployment 
insurance; pensioners only pay for health insurance) 
C. Tax base for income tax (A-B) 
D. Personal income tax 
E. Tax credits 
Standard tax credit (employees and pensioners, family status) 
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Pensioner credit (pensioner only) 
Traffic credit (employees only) 
 Employee credit (employees only) 
Sole earner and sole parent credit (employees and pensioners) 
F. Net current earnings (C-D+E) 
 
The taxation schedules are based on Finances (Various years) and on Hauptverband 
(Various years-a). Due to a lack of information on family status, this study will linearly 
approximate the progressive standard tax credit, assuming a non-sole earner schedule. For 
the same reason, this study has to ignore the sole earner and sole parent tax credit which 
causes a relatively minor calculation error compared to annual earnings. Taxation rules of 
non-current income are different from the above schedule. Non-current income is mainly 
Christmas and vacation allowances, which are normally as high as two monthly earnings. 
The individual has to pay payroll tax, and a flat rate income tax on theses earnings parts, but 
there are no tax credits.
  
  
 APPENDIX 2 
VARIABLES  
 
R = dummy dependent variable, 1 if retired in year t conditional on being in the labor force 
in year t-1, 0 otherwise. 
 
Incentive Variables 
SSW = present discounted value of social security wealth (in 1996 Euros). 
INCENT = one of the below incentive measures (in 1996 Euros). 
ACC = gain or loss in SSW by postponing retirement for one year. 
PV = maximum of SSW minus SSW in current year over all possible retirement years. 
OV = present discounted value of real net earnings plus ACC of postponing retirement for 
one year. 
IST = ACC divided by present discounted value of real net earnings during the year of 
postponing retirement. 
 
Income Controls 
RNEARNNY = prospective real net earnings in year t+1 (in 1996 Euros). 
RNEARNNY2 = RNEARNNY squared. 
PE = pensionable earnings according to pension formula (in 1996 Euros). 
PE2 = PE squared. 
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Age Indicators 
Age53, …, Age 65 = dummies, 1 if aged 53, …, 65 in year t, 0 otherwise. 
 
Individual Characteristics affecting Retirement Behavior 
HEALTH = fraction of time sick or on rehab during work in current year. 
Production = dummy, 1 if working in production sector, 0 otherwise. 
Services = dummy, 1 if working in service sector, 0 otherwise. 
Blue = dummy, 1 if blue collar worker, 0 otherwise. 
White = dummy, 1 if white collar worker, 0 otherwise. 
Vienna = dummy, 1 if work in Vienna, 0 otherwise. 
EAustria = dummy, 1 if work in Eastern Austria, 0 otherwise. 
SAustria = dummy, 1 if work in Southern Austria, 0 otherwise. 
WAustria = dummy, 1 if work in Western Austria, 0 otherwise. 
 
Year Dummies 
Y1998, …, Y2003 = dummies, 1 if observation occurs in year 1998, …, 2003,  0 otherwise. 
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Table A2.1. Descriptive statistics male panel 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Retire 0.119 0.212 0.300 0.253 0.345 0.546 0.244 
year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999.740 
RetYear 2000.771 2001.145 2001.722 2002.459 2002.952 2003.454 2001.656 
Sex 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
YBirth 1941.265 1941.463 1941.807 1942.145 1942.392 1942.630 1941.733 
YearDeath 2093.836 2094.535 2095.360 2096.342 2096.872 2097.536 2095.167 
RNEARNNY 17,859 17,948 17,683 17,603 17,584 18,334 17,816 
RNEARNNY2 375,000,000 387,000,000 382,000,000 383,000,000 385,000,000 408,000,000 384,000,000 
PE 393,326 409,807 419,367 421,927 423,404 429,393 411,350 
PE2 177,000,000,000 191,000,000,000 203,000,000,000 210,000,000,000 214,000,000,000 223,000,000,000 196,000,000,000 
Age53 0.050 - - - - - 0.014 
Age54 0.107 0.053 - - - - 0.042 
Age55 0.135 0.117  0.061 - - - 0.077 
Age56 0.153 0.147 0.137 0.074 - - 0.113 
Age57 0.175 0.167 0.177 0.170 0.088 - 0.153 
Age58 0.161 0.174 0.172 0.188 0.185 0.083 0.167 
Age59 0.139 0.160 0.185 0.195 0.217 0.227 0.174 
Age60 0.080 0.142 0.180 0.225 0.241 0.293 0.163 
Age61 - 0.039 0.064 0.088 0.164 0.236 0.065 
Age62 - - 0.023 0.039 0.041 0.060 0.017 
Age63 - - - 0.022 0.038 0.030 0.009 
Age64 - - - - 0.025 0.041 0.005 
Age65 - - - - - 0.030 0.002 
HEALTH 0.030 0.035 0.037 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.032 
Production 0.485 0.479 0.469 0.427 0.404 0.381 0.458 
Blue 0.452 0.428 0.404 0.378 0.369 0.370 0.414 
Vienna 0.253 0.264 0.273 0.278 0.282 0.295 0.268 
EAustria 0.151 0.152 0.152 0.150 0.145 0.135 0.149 
SAustria 0.120 0.120 0.118 0.117 0.116 0.114 0.119 
Y1999 - 1 - - - - 0.241 
Y2000 - - 1 - - - 0.190 
Y2001 - - - 1 - - 0.133 
Y2002 - - - - 1 - 0.099 
Y2003 - - - - - 1 0.065 
Obs. 20,612 18,157 14,309 10,021 7,489 4,906 75,494 
Indiv. 20,612 18,157 14,309 10,021 7,489 4,906 20,612 
 
Notes: (a) If a person did not die in the panel window, the artificial death year is coded 2100. 
 
(b) If applicable, numbers are in 1996 Euros. 
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Table A2.2. Descriptive statistics female panel 
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total 
Retire 0.170 0.269 0.342 0.301 0.355 0.507 0.272 
year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999.495 
RetYear 2000.338 2000.830 2001.519 2002.338 2002.946 2003.493 2001.249 
Sex 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
YBirth 1942.538 1942.792 1942.998 1943.080 1943.369 1943.731 1942.866 
YearDeath 2097.553 2097.832 2098.153 2098.427 2098.603 2098.807 2097.971 
RNEARNNY 11,831 11,829 11,387 10,780 10,563 10,883 11,491 
RNEARNNY2 194,000,00 198,000,000 187,000,000 173,000,000 169,000,000 178,000,000 189,000,000 
PE 273,369 283,478 287,150 284,813 284,880 287,750 281,364 
PE2 102,000,000,000 108,000,000,000 113,000,000,000 114,000,000,000 114,000,000,000 117,000,000,000 109,000,000,000 
Age53 0.144 - - - - - 0.046 
Age54 0.234 0.174 - - - - 0.120 
Age55 0.215 0.283 0.241 - - - 0.187 
Age56 0.132 0.169 0.222 0.186 - - 0.149 
Age57 0.100 0.121 0.167 0.241 0.160 - 0.134 
Age58 0.080 0.104 0.140 0.213 0.307 0.142 0.133 
Age59 0.060 0.085 0.124 0.187 0.275 0.446 0.126 
Age60 0.034 0.064 0.106 0.173 0.258 0.411 0.104 
HEALTH 0.018 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.018 
Production 0.181 0.170 0.155 0.123 0.112 0.103 0.158 
Blue 0.322 0.302 0.291 0.284 0.291 0.282 0.303 
Vienna 0.259 0.261 0.260 0.275 0.270 0.280 0.263 
EAustria 0.116 0.115 0.112 0.100 0.094 0.092 0.111 
SAustria 0.100 0.101 0.102 0.100 0.103 0.101 0.101 
Y1999 - 1 - - - - 0.261 
Y2000 - - 1 - - - 0.185 
Y2001 - - - 1 - - 0.115 
Y2002 - - - - 1 - 0.075 
Y2003 - - - - - 1 0.044 
Obs. 15,108 12,306 8,706 5,415 3,546 2,072 47,153 
Indiv. 15,108 12,306 8,706 5,415 3,546 2,072 15,108 
 
Notes: see notes of table A2.1.
  
  
APPENDIX 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table A3.1. Linear probability model (fixed effects), males 
Variable ACC Model PV Model OV Model IST Model 
SSW 0.096 0.094 0.096 0.099 
 (57.18)** (54.58)** (57.18)** (59.38)** 
ACC -0.011    
 (9.39)**    
PV  -0.013   
  (10.65)**   
OV   -0.011  
   (9.39)**  
IST    -0.011 
    (6.73)** 
RNEARNNY 0.107 0.11 0.117 0.093 
 (13.28)** (13.56)** (14.12)** (11.69)** 
RNEARNNY2 0 0 0 0 
 (8.46)** (8.61)** (8.46)** (7.40)** 
PE -219.589 -233.208 -219.589 -235.734 
 (8.96)** (9.52)** (8.96)** (9.61)** 
PE2 0 0 0 0 
 (14.41)** (13.99)** (14.41)** (14.30)** 
Age54 -0.092 -0.091 -0.092 -0.094 
 (7.69)** (7.60)** (7.69)** (7.84)** 
Age55 -0.201 -0.199 -0.201 -0.201 
 (17.09)** (16.92)** (17.09)** (17.16)** 
Age56 -0.317 -0.312 -0.317 -0.318 
 (25.94)** (25.48)** (25.94)** (25.98)** 
Age57 -0.307 -0.298 -0.307 -0.31 
 (23.27)** (22.52)** (23.27)** (23.44)** 
Age58 -0.41 -0.392 -0.41 -0.409 
 (28.03)** (26.68)** (28.03)** (27.95)** 
Age59 -0.537 -0.53 -0.537 -0.557 
 (32.80)** (32.22)** (32.80)** (34.02)** 
Age60 -0.356 -0.349 -0.356 -0.37 
 (19.42)** (19.01)** (19.42)** (20.17)** 
Age61 -0.094 -0.091 -0.094 -0.098 
 (4.61)** (4.47)** (4.61)** (4.81)** 
Age62 -0.167 -0.16 -0.167 -0.162 
 (7.12)** (6.83)** (7.12)** (6.92)** 
Age63 -0.103 -0.079 -0.103 -0.094 
 (3.84)** (2.95)** (3.84)** (3.52)** 
Age64 -0.202 -0.2 -0.202 -0.239 
 (6.69)** (6.62)** (6.69)** (7.90)** 
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Table A3.1 continued 
Variable ACC Model PV Model OV Model IST Model 
HEALTH 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.446 
 (28.93)** (28.93)** (28.93)** (29.53)** 
Production -0.222 -0.224 -0.222 -0.224 
 (22.97)** (23.11)** (22.97)** (23.17)** 
Blue 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.021 
 (1.39) (1.5) (1.39) (1.93) 
Vienna 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.251 
 (19.12)** (19.13)** (19.12)** (19.16)** 
EAustria 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 
 (2.79)** (2.79)** (2.79)** (2.77)** 
SAustria -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 -0.102 
 (4.41)** (4.44)** (4.41)** (4.28)** 
Y1999 0.272 0.27 0.272 0.258 
 (59.30)** (59.53)** (59.30)** (56.31)** 
Y2000 0.447 0.446 0.447 0.447 
 (65.06)** (64.85)** (65.06)** (65.06)** 
Y2001 0.635 0.621 0.635 0.649 
 (66.96)** (64.36)** (66.96)** (68.53)** 
Y2002 0.841 0.832 0.841 0.858 
 (69.10)** (67.81)** (69.10)** (70.49)** 
Y2003 1.122 1.111 1.122 1.109 
 (77.81)** (77.25)** (77.81)** (76.94)** 
Constant -0.975 -0.889 -0.975 -1 
 (13.85)** (12.52)** (13.85)** (14.21)* 
     
R-squared (within) 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
Observations 75,494 75,494 75,494 75,494 
Number of Persons 20,612 20,612 20,612 20,612 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates of retirement probability, linear probability model. SSW, ACC, PV, and OV, RNEARNNY (2), and PE(2) are 
in units of 10,000 Euros. Monetary units are in real terms. 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
 
* Significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
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Table A3.2. Linear probability model (fixed effects), females 
Variable ACC Model PV Model OV Model IST Model 
SSW 0.009 0 0.009 0.013 
 (3.91)** (0.08) (3.91)** (6.08)** 
ACC -0.021    
 (10.86)**    
PV  -0.023   
  (11.84)**   
OV   -0.021  
   (10.86)**  
IST    0 
    (0.08) 
RNEARNNY 0.022 0.019 0.042 0.029 
 (1.38) (1.21) (2.65)** (1.84) 
RNEARNNY2 0 0 0 0 
 (0.59) (0.85) (0.59) (0.18) 
PE 29.249 25.525 29.249 -4.946 
 (1.37) (1.2) (1.37) (0.23) 
PE2 0 0 0 0 
 (1.72) (2.42)* (1.72) (1.99)* 
Age54 -0.166 -0.167 -0.166 -0.168 
 (19.59)** (19.69)** (19.59)** (19.77)** 
Age55 0.04 0.038 0.04 0.033 
 (5.08)** (4.75)** (5.08)** (4.14)** 
Age56 -0.013 -0.024 -0.013 -0.024 
 (1.74) (3.06)** (1.74) (3.18)** 
Age57 -0.162 -0.171 -0.162 -0.167 
 (22.70)** (24.02)** (22.70)** (23.48)** 
Age58 -0.289 -0.291 -0.289 -0.289 
 (43.39)** (43.70)** (43.39)** (43.35)** 
Age59 -0.444 -0.457 -0.444 -0.457 
 (67.49)** (70.68)** (67.49)** (70.37)** 
HEALTH -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.075 
 (2.42)* (2.43)* (2.42)* (2.59)** 
Production -0.177 -0.177 -0.177 -0.18 
 (7.28)** (7.30)** (7.28)** (7.39)** 
Blue 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.009 
 (0.05) (0.19) (0.05) (0.57) 
Vienna 0.166 0.161 0.166 0.174 
 (8.52)** (8.25)** (8.52)** (8.91)** 
EAustria -0.054 -0.06 -0.054 -0.049 
 (1.55) (1.71) (1.55) (1.38) 
SAustria -0.05 -0.051 -0.05 -0.041 
 (1.16) (1.2) (1.16) (0.95) 
Y1999 0.304 0.274 0.304 0.258 
 (49.66)** (59.18)** (49.66)** (52.35)** 
Y2000 0.446 0.428 0.446 0.442 
 (60.89)** (57.79)** (60.89)** (60.26)** 
Y2001 0.606 0.587 0.606 0.62 
 (88.53)** (80.97)** (88.53)** (91.45)** 
Y2002 0.81 0.788 0.81 0.815 
 (94.03)** (88.36)** (94.03)** (94.48)** 
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Table A.3.3 continued 
Variable ACC Model PV Model OV Model IST Model 
Y2003 1.074 1.027 1.074 1.041 
 (95.43)** (94.35)** (95.43)** (95.28)** 
Constant -0.301 -0.088 -0.301 -0.337 
 (5.65)** (1.54) (5.65)** (6.32)** 
     
     
R-squared (within) 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
Observations 47,153 47,153 47,153 47,153 
Number of Persons 15,108 15,108 15,108 15,108 
  
Notes: Coefficient estimates on retirement probability, linear probability model. SSW, ACC, PV, and OV, RNEARNNY (2), and PE(2) are 
in units of 10,000 Euros. 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
 
* Significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
  
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
SIMULATIONS 
 
 
Table A4.1. Age profile of incentive measures, by sex and scenario 
SSW Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 
53 255,425 255,425   0 234,909 234,909   0 
54 270,665 270,665   0 232,398 232,398   0 
55 275,810 275,810   0 238,683 238,683   149,510
56 277,419 279,400 256,576 277,419 0 243,624 244,933 235,796 235,868 168,786
57 275,453 276,840 270,063 276,207 0 242,416 248,397 228,230 236,038 177,017
58 281,327 283,752 275,425 278,952 0 240,142 248,697 227,594 249,305 186,472
59 283,301 284,776 280,652 278,722 0 238,531 246,876 229,828 251,255 193,726
60 295,759 296,029 295,425 281,278 90,520 242,726 242,282 243,090 257,010 198,299
61 285,613 306,399 275,278 284,837 93,445 260,750 255,465 264,315   
62 281,134 314,334 270,180 305,399 141,404 271,347 276,285 269,720   
63 260,236  260,236 319,260 191,154 302,902  302,902   
64 253,110  253,110 310,329 245,165 293,048  293,048   
65 274,149  274,149 325,692 263,819 287,084  287,084   
           
ACC Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 
53 1,893 1,893   0 1,463 1,463   0 
54 3,986 3,986   0 11,860 11,860   0 
55 3,619 3,619   0 14,659 14,659   8,262
56 2,063 2,368 -1,143 2,533 0 13,234 15,656 -1,253 3,187 7,193
57 3,456 4,966 -2,413 1,381 0 9,051 13,316 -1,067 19,137 6,240
58 1,992 2,869 -144 1,618 0 6,914 11,512 171 10,939 5,806
59 14,682 21,743 2,006 5,069 0 13,517 9,210 18,009 14,718 5,890
60 9,034 12,009 5,349 -1,174 4,878 6,085 5,934 6,208 7,558 5,394
61 5,484 12,108 2,189 22,891 4,573 4,596 3,550 5,302   
62 1,234 -1,480 2,130 22,995 4,331 20,198 -3,840 28,119   
63 1,419  1,419 1,738 5,441 -7,061  -7,061   
64 35,157  35,157 32,857 7,592 -1,600  -1,600   
65 17,797  17,797 10,606 7,810 6,667  6,667   
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Table A4.1 continued 
PV Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 
53 -7,210 -7,210   0 7,473 7,473   0 
54 -6,392 -6,392   0 14,725 14,725   0 
55 -6,650 -6,650   0 13,876 13,876   4,586
56 -5,999 -5,432 -11,967 -9,155 0 9,421 12,901 -11,394 12,801 1,951
57 -1,936 925 -13,055 -8,873 0 6,122 8,665 90 18,090 252
58 2,571 7,984 -10,601 -5,306 0 6,555 4,811 9,112 9,579 -1,030
59 6,388 14,891 -8,875 6,043 0 5,912 632 11,417 8,537 -1,589
60 -815 3,142 -5,714 8,356 2,973 505 -3,351 3,665 -57 -2,558
61 -6,073 -671 -8,759 25,093 2,139 2,331 -7,242 8,788   
62 -4,698 -14,127 -1,587 14,156 -733 8,869 -15,071 16,758   
63 12,249  12,249 4,227 -2,325 -19,559  -19,559   
64 28,125  28,125 20,057 -2,815 -13,772  -13,772   
65 5,741  5,741 -3,717 -3,792 -5,958  -5,958   
           
OV Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 
53 16,472 16,472   0 13,513 13,513   0 
54 19,855 19,855   0 23,432 23,432   0 
55 19,873 19,873   0 26,455 26,455   20,058
56 18,795 19,459 11,807 19,265 0 24,667 27,064 10,336 14,621 18,627
57 20,445 22,370 12,965 18,371 0 19,848 24,083 9,804 29,935 17,037
58 19,284 20,339 16,719 18,910 0 17,259 21,855 10,518 21,283 16,151
59 31,946 38,807 19,630 22,334 0 23,605 19,587 27,794 24,806 15,977
60 26,561 29,457 22,976 16,353 22,406 15,972 15,973 15,970 17,445 15,281
61 22,706 29,905 19,127 40,113 21,796 14,926 13,115 16,147   
62 18,996 15,270 20,225 40,757 22,093 29,671 4,659 37,912   
63 18,318  18,318 18,637 22,341 1,574  1,574   
64 51,624  51,624 49,325 24,059 6,461  6,461   
65 33,572  33,572 26,381 23,585 16,323  16,323   
           
IST Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 
53 -0.074 -0.074   0 -0.075 -0.075   0 
54 -0.278 -0.278   0 -0.906 -0.906   0 
55 -0.219 -0.219   0 -1.120 -1.120   -0.701
56 -0.104 -0.129 0.161 -0.131 0 -0.975 -1.156 0.104 -0.247 -0.565
57 -0.185 -0.278 0.176 -0.067 0 -0.695 -1.067 0.186 -1.475 -0.509
58 -0.120 -0.171 0.005 -0.098 0 -0.487 -0.912 0.138 -0.791 -0.478
59 -0.813 -1.208 -0.106 -0.288 0 -0.890 -0.661 -1.129 -0.984 -0.462
60 -0.476 -0.667 -0.240 0.095 -0.282 -0.383 -0.429 -0.345 -0.495 -0.432
61 -0.305 -0.670 -0.123 -1.256 -0.259 -0.271 -0.224 -0.303   
62 -0.041 0.071 -0.078 -1.195 -0.225 -1.686 0.623 -2.446   
63 0.040  0.040 0.064 -0.263 1.179  1.179   
64 -1.802   0.838   -1.802 -1.639 -0.356 0.838 
-0.953   -0.491 65   -0.953 -0.563 -0.464 -0.491 
 
Notes: Numbers are age profiles of the incentive measure showing means in 1996 Euros. The table compares the means of the 
incentive measure in the base case, pre and post reform 2000, for simulations S1 and S2. 
  
 94
Table A4.2. Predicted retirement probabilities, by sex and age 
ACC Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 
Post 
2000 S1 S2 
53 0.301 0.301   0.000 0.121 0.121   0.000 
54 0.282 0.282   0.000 0.098 0.098   0.000 
55 0.253 0.253   0.000 0.329 0.329   0.272 
56 0.209 0.179 0.523 0.526 0.000 0.368 0.316 0.679 0.102 0.320 
57 0.244 0.165 0.552 0.424 0.000 0.321 0.210 0.586 0.083 0.273 
58 0.213 0.106 0.475 0.390 0.000 0.300 0.138 0.539 0.341 0.258 
59 0.154 0.043 0.354 0.351 0.000 0.250 0.080 0.427 0.367 0.227 
60 0.417 0.256 0.616 0.387 0.003 0.629 0.373 0.839 0.326 0.604 
61 0.684 0.602 0.724 0.341 0.025      
62 0.623 0.718 0.592 0.372 0.106      
63 0.604  0.604 0.529 0.292      
64 0.562  0.562 0.644 0.422      
65 0.978  0.978 0.691 0.695      
           
PV Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 
Post 
2000 S1 S2 
53 0.309 0.309   0.000 0.112 0.112   0.000 
54 0.286 0.286   0.000 0.087 0.087   0.000 
55 0.256 0.256   0.000 0.324 0.324   0.343 
56 0.211 0.181 0.525 0.529 0.000 0.360 0.303 0.701 0.105 0.374 
57 0.245 0.166 0.554 0.427 0.000 0.312 0.197 0.586 0.086 0.320 
58 0.215 0.104 0.485 0.390 0.000 0.289 0.128 0.526 0.334 0.300 
59 0.156 0.046 0.353 0.347 0.000 0.241 0.063 0.426 0.362 0.252 
60 0.415 0.257 0.610 0.380 0.004 0.637 0.383 0.846 0.322 0.641 
61 0.679 0.599 0.719 0.339 0.029      
62 0.617 0.721 0.582 0.369 0.113      
63 0.594  0.594 0.518 0.299      
64 0.550  0.550 0.635 0.422      
65 0.973  0.973 0.685 0.690      
           
OV Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 
Post 
2000 S1 S2 
53 0.301 0.301   0.000 0.121 0.121   0.000 
54 0.282 0.282   0.000 0.098 0.098   0.000 
55 0.253 0.253   0.000 0.329 0.329   0.273 
56 0.209 0.179 0.523 0.525 0.000 0.368 0.316 0.679 0.106 0.320 
57 0.244 0.165 0.552 0.423 0.000 0.321 0.210 0.586 0.086 0.274 
58 0.213 0.106 0.475 0.389 0.000 0.300 0.138 0.539 0.345 0.259 
59 0.154 0.043 0.354 0.350 0.000 0.250 0.080 0.427 0.371 0.228 
60 0.417 0.256 0.616 0.386 0.003 0.629 0.373 0.839 0.328 0.603 
61 0.684 0.602 0.724 0.340 0.025      
62 0.623 0.718 0.592 0.371 0.104      
63 0.604  0.604 0.530 0.291      
64 0.562  0.562 0.646 0.423      
65 0.978  0.978 0.694 0.697      
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Table A4.2 continued 
IST Males     Females     
Age Base case Pre 2000 Post 2000 S1 S2 Base case Pre 2000 
Post 
2000 S1 S2 
53 0.305 0.305   0.000 0.116 0.116   0.000 
54 0.283 0.283   0.000 0.095 0.095   0.000 
55 0.252 0.252   0.000 0.328 0.328   0.217 
56 0.208 0.176 0.535 0.533 0.000 0.369 0.318 0.673 0.092 0.273 
57 0.242 0.161 0.558 0.426 0.000 0.323 0.213 0.582 0.075 0.243 
58 0.213 0.102 0.484 0.392 0.000 0.301 0.142 0.535 0.332 0.238 
59 0.153 0.048 0.341 0.356 0.000 0.253 0.076 0.437 0.367 0.202 
60 0.416 0.256 0.614 0.388 0.003 0.631 0.371 0.845 0.326 0.592 
61 0.685 0.613 0.720 0.359 0.023      
62 0.627 0.726 0.594 0.382 0.105      
63 0.609  0.609 0.524 0.294      
64 0.571  0.571 0.664 0.410      
65 0.981  0.981 0.701 0.679      
 
Notes: (a) Predicted retirement probabilities at various ages. The table compares the age profiles using 5 different simulation scenarios: the 
base case, pre and post reform 2000, simulation S1 (delay in all retirement eligibility ages by 3 years), and simulation S2 (common reform; 
no disability option, replacement rate at ages 65/60 is sixty percent, every year of early retirement reduces the age 56/60 benefit by 6 
percent). 
 
(b) The retirement probabilities are calculated by predicting the probability of retirement for each observation, then averaging these 
probabilities by age. For each scenario, changes in SSW and the respective incentive measure are represented in the predictions. 
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Table A4.3. Expenditure savings by reform scenarios (in percent), by sex and age 
ACC Males   Females   
Age Reform 2000 S1 S2 Reform 2000 S1 S2 
53   -1.000   -1.000 
54   -1.000   -1.000 
55   -1.000   -0.483 
56 1.682 1.518 -1.000 1.069 -0.732 -0.398 
57 2.264 0.743 -1.000 1.565 -0.748 -0.380 
58 3.374 0.813 -1.000 2.583 0.179 -0.333 
59 7.022 1.235 -1.000 3.988 0.549 -0.262 
60 1.404 -0.116 -0.998 1.259 -0.450 -0.215 
61 0.082 -0.503 -0.988    
62 -0.291 -0.352 -0.915    
63  0.074 -0.645    
64  0.405 -0.272    
65  -0.161 -0.317    
       
PV Males   Females   
Age Reform 2000 S1 S2 Reform 2000 S1 S2 
53   -1.000   -1.000 
54   -1.000   -1.000 
55   -1.000   -0.338 
56 1.667 1.511 -1.000 1.226 -0.719 -0.281 
57 2.257 0.743 -1.000 1.735 -0.732 -0.252 
58 3.514 0.799 -1.000 2.772 0.199 -0.196 
59 6.609 1.194 -1.000 5.287 0.585 -0.148 
60 1.374 -0.128 -0.997 1.219 -0.465 -0.178 
61 0.078 -0.502 -0.986    
62 -0.305 -0.350 -0.908    
63  0.070 -0.630    
64  0.415 -0.258    
65  -0.164 -0.317    
       
OV Males   Females   
Age Reform 2000 S1 S2 Reform 2000 S1 S2 
53   -1.000   -1.000 
54   -1.000   -1.000 
55   -1.000   -0.481 
56 1.682 1.512 -1.000 1.069 -0.721 -0.397 
57 2.264 0.739 -1.000 1.565 -0.739 -0.378 
58 3.374 0.808 -1.000 2.583 0.191 -0.331 
59 7.022 1.228 -1.000 3.988 0.563 -0.259 
60 1.404 -0.118 -0.998 1.259 -0.447 -0.216 
61 0.082 -0.504 -0.988    
62 -0.291 -0.354 -0.916    
63  0.076 -0.646    
64  0.409 -0.271    
65  -0.156 -0.314    
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Table A4.3 continued 
IST Males   Females   
Age Reform 2000 S1 S2 Reform 2000 S1 S2 
53   -1.000   -1.000 
54   -1.000   -1.000 
55   -1.000   -0.585 
56 1.783 1.569 -1.000 1.041 -0.760 -0.486 
57 2.372 0.761 -1.000 1.508 -0.773 -0.451 
58 3.609 0.824 -1.000 2.443 0.145 -0.386 
59 5.989 1.292 -1.000 4.370 0.530 -0.351 
60 1.392 -0.115 -0.998 1.286 -0.453 -0.233 
61 0.056 -0.477 -0.989    
62 -0.297 -0.338 -0.915    
63  0.056 -0.645    
64  0.426 -0.305    
65  -0.151 -0.334    
 
Notes: (a) The table compares the public expenditure savings in SSW for reform 2000, simulation S1 (delay in all retirement eligibility ages 
by 3 years), and simulation S2 (common reform; no disability option, replacement rate at ages 65/60 is sixty percent, every year of early 
retirement reduces the age 56/60 benefit by 6 percent). Numbers represent the percentage change in SSW expenditures for a mean 
representative retiree of age a weighted by predicted retirement probabilities. The reference scenario for S1 and S2 is the base case, for 
reform 2000 it is the pre reform 2000 scenario. Negative numbers indicate a decline in public expenditures. 
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 Figure A4.1. Age profile of predicted retirement probability, ACC model, by sex. 
 
Notes: (a) Predicted retirement probabilities at various ages. The table compares the age profiles using 5 different simulation scenarios: the 
base case, pre and post reform 2000, simulation S1 (delay in all retirement eligibility ages by 3 years), and simulation S2 (common reform; 
no disability option, replacement rate at ages 65/60 is sixty percent, every year of early retirement reduces the age 56/60 benefit by 6 
percent). 
 
(b) The retirement probabilities are calculated by predicting the probability of retirement for each observation, then averaging these 
probabilities by age. For each scenario, changes in SSW and the respective incentive measure are represented in the predictions. 
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 Figure A4.2. Age profile of predicted retirement probability, PV model, by sex. 
 
Notes: see notes of figure A4.1. 
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 Figure A4.3. Age profile of predicted retirement probability, OV model, by sex. 
 
Notes: see notes of figure A4.1. 
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 Figure A4.4. Age profile of predicted retirement probability, IST model, by sex. 
 
Notes: see notes of figure A4.1. 
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